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Aristotle's Method of Homeric Study

as shown in the

Treatment of the Contradictions of Homer

by the

Ἐνστατικοί and Λυτικοί.

—◇—

A Dissertation

Presented to the Board of University Studies of

Johns Hopkins University for the degree

of Doctor of Philosophy.

By

A. Mitchell Carroll,

1893.

Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ὀρθότης
ἐστὶν τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῆς ποιητι-
κῆς οὐδὲ ἄλλης τέχνης καὶ ποιητικῆς.

Ar. Poet. 1460b. 13-15.

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Aristotle's Method of Homeric Study
as shown in the
Treatment of the Contradictions of Homer
by the
Ἐνστατικοί and Λυτικοί.



Introduction.

The problems, which form the basis of what is known as 'the Homeric Question', are of two kinds, external and internal. Everything pertaining to the former, such as the art of writing among the Greeks, the manner of transmission of the Homeric poems, the changes suffered at the hands of revisers and their final collection and arrangement, was fully discussed by Wolf in his Prolegomena. It remained for the [illegible] of Wolf to add strength to his views. Such diverse treatment [illegible] Ed. has served only to emphasize the importance of a study of their most characteristic

The first to bring forward a systematic based on critical study was F. H. C. Naeke, one of Wolf's students, in his Commentatio de discriptatis quibusdam in Odysseam accessionibus, Hafniae 1806. Naeke found out the presence of a number of inconsistencies in the Odyssey, particularly between the first four books and the remainder, and based upon them the theory that the Odyssey is the result of a subsequent uniting into one whole of many formerly independent poems. In a similar manner some years later the existence of numerous inconsistencies in the Iliad, chiefly in regard to the Trojan Plain and to homonymic previously indicated by Wolf, was pointed out by F. A. W. Spohn in his essay De rebus Trojanis ex Carminibus Homericis descriptis, appearing in 1814 as a supplement to the Leipzig edition of Pausanias' Itineraria.

From such beginnings the study of the poems which

Volkmann, Wolfische Prolegomena zu Homer, §§ 1-5, 9.

acteristics of the poems became the leading feature of Homeric criticism. Inconsistencies were shown by each succeeding critic to be present in greater number and variety. In the various theories of Hermann, Lachmann, Hetzrodt, Grote and others concerning the original form and authorship of the Homeric poems, they have been explained as the result of interpolations, or have been seized upon as favorable to theories advocating the existence of originally independent and disconnected poems, which were finally built up into great epics by a later hand.

It is fortunate for modern criticism that a different treatment of Homeric inconsistencies has developed. Instead of taking them as conclusive proof of a variety of authorship the attempt has been made by certain scholars to explain them from the nature of the Epos. Looking at the grander features of moral and poetic harmony in the poems they have sought to show that inconsistencies are

peculiar characteristics of epic poetry. Thus Volkmann among others, has shown that they exist in epic forms, ancient and modern, in which there is no suspicion of diverse origin and interpolations, such as Orgel und Laute; he also emphasizes the psychological cause of inconsistencies. Rutzhorn[1] argues that they are not therefore so inherently with the Homeric poetic art, that no hypothesis can remove them. Frey[2] develops the idea that the poet in his desire for the beautiful is indifferent to the natural and the logical. Cohen[3] and Nitzsch[4] regard these inconsistencies as flaws of composition which affect the ground work of the poems. Lauer[5]

[1] Wolfsche Proleg. zu Homer, Leipzig 1874, ff. 148 sq.

[2] Die Entstehungsweise der Homerischen Gedichte, Leipzig, 1865 ff. 100

[3] Homer, Bern, 1881 f. 225 sq.

[4] Prolegomena Homeri Ilias, Leipzig 1874 ff. 35.

[5] Die Entwickelung der Homerischen Poesie. Berlin, 1852 ff. 17.

[6] Eine Schwäche der Homerischen Kunstart. Rh. Mus. XLVII [illegible] 22.

explains a number of inconsistencies by the theory that uraveness in logical perspective is an essential peculiarity of the antique epic manner of thinking. And many other have explained inconsistencies along some line of poetic liberty and negligence of detail.

In the great interest manifested in modern times in Homeric inconsistencies the fact has been to a great extent overlooked that the ancients were not blind to the shortcomings of the poet. Herodotus (II. 117) it is true, implies that in his opinion Homer never contradicts himself, as he argues that the Cypria Epic was not written by Homer because it contains a line at variance with one in the Iliad. But this view was not universal even in his day. At a very early period Homer became the object of attack for philosophers and critics who noted [illegible] of all sorts. His [illegible] in matters [illegible]

the latter in thought and language. The sophists and historians formed the philosophers, Aristotle, to the exclusion of the first, who made [illegible] particularly in language. Speech of study in the Epicurean determined certain principles of explanation. Seldom by the interest these manifested many of the Peripatetics furthered the teachings of their master. Zeno and his followers also were attracted to them, making them responsible for their theories of the real and the allegorical in Homer. The great Alexandrian grammarians further furnish many proofs of a knowledge of their existence but they were far from basing on them theories of a complete authorship of the Homeric poems, their great remedy for inconsistencies of all sorts being Athetesis. The nearest approach to this view was that made by an [illegible]

[illegible] Ὅτι ἕτερον ποιητὴν τῶν τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἐποίησε, [illegible] καὶ διδάσκων ὅτι τὰ μὲν κατὰ δόξαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γέγραφε. Ἔπειτα καὶ ἀναίρεσιν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ποιούμενος ἐν τοῖς δοκοῦσιν ἐναντίοις ὑπάρχειν.

[2] Cf. Bursian, Jahrb. I. S. 74. 1873.

'Separatists', coming from Alexandria in the early 2nd cent. B.C., assigned the Iliad to Homer and the Odyssey to some other. Their theories were based on fresh examination of existing editions of the two poems. Despite their assumption that they were objects of study in the Library in the fifth cent. that Homer was transmitted by memory and afterwards pieced together from the separate songs, which is an explanation for the number of discrepancies which it presents.

These from a very early period Homeric inconsistencies were an object of cavil, and later commentators, following out the lines of criticism laid down by the great heads of schools, raised up the formula, chiefly in the form of what is commonly called ἀπὸ διαφώνων or διαφώνων. The technical name given to such critics was διορθωτικοί and διορθωταί, and that portion of the Homeric scholia which is derived from the works of Porphyry (c. 270 A.D.), preserves interesting fragments of their criticisms, which show

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'Scripsit fuisse

along certain lines the influence of Aristotle, the first great scientific [illegible]. I purpose in this dissertation to set forth Aristotle's method of Homeric study, as [illegible] in the Fragments of the Προβλήματα and Ἀπορήματα, limiting my consideration to their treatment of inconsistencies in statement or contradictions in the poems of Homer.

I.

The Ἐνστατικοί and Λυτικοί.

1. The Nature of their Criticisms.

In the spacious galleries, connected with the museums, gymnasia and estates of the wealthy at Alexandria, in the days of her literary greatness, and at other large centres of learning, the grammarians were accustomed to assemble and engage in disputes bearing on philological questions.[1] conversing thus without the aid of the written page, so that many phases of their work could not well be discussed they turned their attention naturally to the consideration of questions of minor importance such as would exercise their subtlety of intellect and add to the enjoyment of their leisure moments. Hence it was their custom to propound and [illegible]

[1] Schol. Hom. Il. I. 682. Vitruv. V. II.

based upon passages of peculiar interest in the authors who were the objects of their more serious work. Also at all banquets of the learned, the custom prevailed for the guests to consider such questions.[1] After the guests had tired of feasting and the cups had been set before them, the rest of the night was spent in literary or scientific discussion, not on themes of grave and serious import but such as Bacchus would inspire. Gellius tells the nature of these questions: "Iucerebantur autem non gravia nec reverenda, sed exlepidiora quaedam lepida et minuta et floruletum vino animum laetificula" (VII (VI) 13. 4). "Iucerebantur autem res huiusce modi, aut sententia poetae oratoris lepide obscura, aut vocabuli, aut historiae antiquioris requisitio, aut decreti cuiusquam ex philosophia propositi inventio [illegible]

[1] For descriptions of such banquets cf. Plut. Symp. Quaest. II 2 sq., Gell. VII (VI) 13; XVIII 2; [illegible]

aut sophismatis sophisticae solutio, aut inopinati
rationisque verbi indagatio, aut tempus, item in verbo
postremo obscurissimum" (xviii. 7. 6.)

The usual Greek term for such questions was
ζητήματα, though προβλήματα, ἀπορήματα, ἀπορίαι,
ζητήσεις are frequently used. The answers were
known as λύσεις. As the questions usually found
fault with some statement or sentiment of the author
under discussion, anyone who propounded them was
at length known as ὁ ἐνστατικός, 'the objector'. The
answerer, who sought to remove the difficulty, was
naturally designated ὁ λυτικός, 'the solver'. Hence the
class of grammarians who engaged in impugning
and defending points in authors was known as
Ἐνστατικοί and Λυτικοί.

Schol. Il. I. 652: Ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ τῇ κατὰ Ἀλεξάνδρειαν
νόμος ἦν προβάλλεσθαι ζητήματα καὶ τὰς γραμματικὰς
λύσεις ἀναγράφειν.

2. Origin and Development of the Tropes.

To understand the beginnings of this practice it is necessary to go back to the attacks made upon Homer by the philosophers who censured the poet for his theology. Of these Xenophanes of Kolophon (circ. 540 B.C.) is the earliest on record who blamed Homer and Hesiod for imputing to the gods everything θεοὺς ἀνομάκασιν ἔπεσιν κλέψαι τε μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν; and Heraclitus,[3] the contemporary of Xenophanes, said that Homer and Archilochus deserved to be scourged.

The sophists and rhetoricians followed the philosophers in finding fault with Homer. Their object of censure however was not piety in mythology but inaccuracy in grammar and diction. In their rhetorical

[3] De Sophistarum studiis Homericis. A. Pfund. E. Mus. Philol. Rahnius I. p. 130. 1833

Heller. Quaest. Lyric. XIII 16(3) [illegible] Ueberweg Gesch. d. [illegible]

exercises (ἐπιδείξεις) they would cite passages as faulty in expression or contradictory in statement and discuss astutely about the signification of words. In this manner they brought into prominence those questions (ζητήματα, προβλήματα, ἀπορήματα) which were later to play such a unique part in Homeric criticism. These questions they discussed not so much that they might interpret the poet correctly, as to show the dexterity of their dialectic and the elegance of their diction. Protagoras for example rebuked the poet because he had invoked the muse unbecomingly in using the imperative mood; Hippias in the Platonic dialogues boasts that he can discuss shrewdly the sentiments and faults of Homer; and Prodicus of Keos, Gorgias of Leontini, ... Alcidamas of Elea and other sophists treated similar Homeric themes. By far the most famous

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Mr. Park. XIX. 5 Cf. Prof. Gilbertson, Mr. C.W.E. Miller, A.J.P. XLII p 5...

type of this class was Zoilus Amphipolitanus (ca. 300 B.C.?) known as the 'Homeromastix', who exhibited both the subtlety of a sophist and the ingenuity of a philologian in his φῦρος Ὁμήρου, κατὰ τοῦ Ὁμήρου inscribed by [illegible]

Notwithstanding the faulty methods of the sophists they were frequently right and they deserve credit for arousing by their questionings and censures others to a more accurate study of all these problems. By their citations of Homer in their lectures and by special words on interpreting his poems, they called the attention of thinking men not only to the study of Homeric words and their signification but also to the study of the poems as a whole and the relation of the various parts to each other.

Lehrs, De Aristarchi Stud. Hom. p. 204. Cf. Schol. V. I. [illegible]

3. Aristotle's Influence on the Development of the Iy

The most conspicuous among those who came to the defense of the poet against the attacks of philosophers and sophists, was Aristotle.

The abundant citations of Homer in his works show the hearty veneration of the philosopher for the poet and to this fact we may attribute his appearance as an apologist. Whether it be true or not that Aristotle prepared for Alexander a recension of the text of Homer for which there is some evidence, there are many proofs of his contributions to Homeric criticism. Thus Schrader testifies that a number of Aristotle's dialogues concerned themselves with Homer. Besides this there is evidence that he wrote a number of commentaries to Homer, Hesiod and other poets.

'Senzebusch, Dissertationes Homericae I p 11 sq

Ἱλιο Schrader. cm. l. καὶ δὴ καὶ τινὲς Ἀριστοτέλους ἐφ' οὗ φασιν εἶχε κρίσιν καὶ γραμματικὴν ἀρχὴν λαβεῖν, ἐν πολλοῖς διαλόγοις περὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ διέξιοι θαυμάσιον ὡσὰν ὡς τὸ πολὺ καὶ τιμῶν. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικός.

these were entitled problemes (ἀπορήματα, προβλήματα) because he proposed questions on some passage of Homer and present one or more solutions to them. His Homeric work of this sort is known as προβλήματα Ὁμηρικά or ἀπορήματα Ὁμηρικά. Singehausen thinks it certain that the Ἀπορημάτων Ὁμηρικῶν αβγδεϛ mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (V. 12. 26), numbered as seven with the first catalogue of the 3rd Vita of Ar., must be the same as the ten books προβλημάτων Ὁμηρικῶν in the last catalogue of the 3rd Vita and τὰ Ὁμήρου προβλήματα in the 2nd Vita. He reconciles the numbers by deciding that the number of books must have been ten and suggesting an emendation of Diogenes. But this is such that number. Fragments of this work are present in the Homeric Scholia and elsewhere, and have been collected and edited by Valentin Rose, Heitz, Emil Heitz, Scholz and others

Valentin Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus. Lipsiae 1863. p. 1
v Ar. Op. vol V. ed. Berl. 1831
31 Aristarchi Stud. Hom. p. 227 32 Ar. Op. vol IV ed. Paris 1848

have disputed their genuineness but Wolf, Spengel,
Hilg, Schmidt, Bachmann and Köne[1] found
conclusive proofs in support of it; and the present
study will exhibit additional evidence in favor
of this view.

The nature of the original work can be inferred
in many ways by the fragments which have been
preserved. Wolf[2] says that in them may be recog-
nized Aristotles method of interpretation, Egger[3]
finds in them all the elements of a recension, as
there are treated in them questions of etymology,
textual criticism, poetical technique, inconsistencies
But we are not confined more to these fragments
to form a judgment of Aristotles method of Homeric

[1] Die Problemata Schriften des Aristoteles. Leipzig 1845 passim
[2] Proleg. Quaestt. Hom. ad Il. Relig. Siegen. 1830. p 115 sq.
[3] De Aristot. Studiis Homericis. Berlin 1863. p 20 sq.
[4] Die Homercitate u. die Hom. Fragm. d. Arist. [illegible] passim
[5] Proleg 1845. [6] Essai sur l'Histoire de la Critique chez les Grecs Paris 1887 p 167 sq

study. Chapter XXV (XXVI) of the Poetics treats of the various objections brought against poets and poetry and methods of answering them. And there is little doubt that the principles and methods laid down in this chapter are but an abridgment of those contained in the larger works of unpublished figures treating of Homeric difficulties, and those of other poets; and this may account for the extreme condensation of the chapter and the critical doubts that have attended all study of this portion of the Poetics. [illegible] of a proper conception of the Aristotelean treatment of Homeric difficulties, an analysis of the chapter is necessary.

Analysis of Poetics XXV:

1460b 6-22: In the beginning of the chapter certain considerations are laid down to which recourse must be had for meeting the objections stated in the problems: viz: (a) the various possibilities of poetic imitation; (b) the privileges of poetic language; (c) the correctness of the poetic art.

22-32: Taking up the last consideration, if the poet has represented something impossible with respect to any other art, says Aristotle, it is an excusable fault if the poet by means of that attains the end of poetry (εἰ τυγχάνει τοῦ τέλους τοῦ αὐτῆς); and a mistake is pardonable if it is in things incidental (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) rather than essential to the poetic art.

1460b 10-11, 32-1461a 4: As the possibilities of poetic imitation (a) are three — to represent things, either such as they were or are, οἷα ἦσαν ἢ εἰσίν, or such as they are said to be and appear to be, οἷα φασὶ καὶ δοκεῖ, or such as they should be, οἷα εἶναι δεῖ — if the poet

is censured because he has represented things not as they actually are, he may answer that he has represented them as they should be; and if in neither of these ways, as they are said to be and believed to be, as in the poetic descriptions of the gods. Again, what the poet has represented may be not what is best but what is a fact, as in the passage about the arms (Il. K. 152).

1461a 4 31: After this aesthetic and moral exegesis, Aristotle takes up the second consideration and lays down methods of solution to be drawn from the language. These meet difficulties found in special words or phrases and may be classified as follows:

1. Through the acceptation of an obsolete term or provincialism (γλῶττη)
2. By means of a metaphorical explanation (κατὰ μεταφοράν)
3. By appealing to the accent (κατὰ προσῳδίαν)
4. By appealing to punctuation (διαστολή)
5. By understanding ambiguity of expression (ἀμφιβολία)

6. By appealing to the Usus Loquendi (καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἔθους τῆς λέξεως).

1461a 31-35: Then follows a special principle for the treatment of contradictions, viz: if a word in any passage seems to indicate some contradiction (ἐναντίωσίν τι), it must be considered in how many senses it may be understood (πόσαχῶς ἂν σημαίνοι).

1461a 35-b9: Many objections are to be met by the explanation of Glaucon that some critics read into Homer their own preconceived opinions and then censure the poet for what is contradictory to these. All the λύσεις above mentioned are richly illustrated by means of examples.

In addition, the author lays down some general principles to meet objections drawn from certain special sources.

1461a 4-9: To judge the moral status of anyone's sayings or doings (περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἢ ἐργασθέν τινι ἢ εἰρημένῳ), we are not to consider the action or

speech alone whether it be noble or base but also the one acting or speaking, to whom, at what time, in what manner and for what end.

1461b9-21: b) The impossible (τὸ ἀδύνατον) is to be justified by referring either to the end of poetry or to what is best or to common belief.

c) The unreasonable (τὸ ἄλογον) must be referred to the common belief of men (πρὸς ἃ φασιν)

d) When statements have been made contradictory to one another (τὰ διαπεπτωκότα εἰς ἐριστικὰς) we must examine them just as we do confutations in logic, whether the same thing be actually spoken of in relation to the same object and in the same manner and whether also in the contradiction the poet is contradictory to what he himself says or to a supposition which every man of sense would tacitly make.

1461b22-25: Aristotle concludes the chapter by formulating the points of view from which objections arise, being five viz: as impossible (τὸ

ἃ δύναται), as improbable (ὡς ἄλογα), as immoral (ὡς βλαβερά), as contradictory (ὡς ὑπεναντία), or as contrary to the rules of poetry (ὡς παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην). The λύσεις, he adds, must be examined from what has been said, and they are twelve.

4. The Study of Homeric Ζητήματα in the Lyceum

That the poetry of Homer was one of the subjects of disputation among the students of the Lyceum is attested by Isaak. Vossianus 16, f. 13: ἐν τῷ λυκείῳ περιπατοῦσι ..... διελέγοντο περί τε τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν καὶ τῆς Ἡσιόδου καὶ τῆς Ὁμήρου ποιήσεως. That the favourite method of instruction and entertainment among them seems to have been the λύσις of ἀπορίαι. Hence we may safely conclude that the methods of exegesis laid down in the chapter of the Poetics just analyzed,

were frequently the subject of dispute in the discussions of the Lyceum. This statement is borne out by the activity of many of the disciples of Aristotle in answering objections made to the poetry of Homer and other poets.

Heracleides Ponticus[1], a prominent disciple of Plato and of Aristotle wrote, among other things, Περὶ τῆς Ἰλιακῆς Νόσου (Diog. La. V. 88.). To him are accredited by some solutions found in the schol. H. , B 649, Γ 236 Dd. : B 57, 63, Υ 119.

Megarchides is perhaps of next importance among the Peripatetics who wrote about Homer. His Homeric studies are attested by the schol. K 214, Ψ 140, X 26. 205 (Sieg. says that the statements of Megarchides to X 26. 205 are derived from the teachings of Aristotle) § 1069. The Homeric fragments bearing his name were probably from the work Μ ραψῳδίης ἐν τοῖς Περὶ Ὁμήρου, mentioned by Suidas.

[1] Susemihl. p. 780.

[2] W. Schrader. Heraclidea. Philol. XLIV. pp. 236-49.

'Chamaileon' is the name of another Peripatetic who concerned himself actively with Homeric criticism as is shown by schol. H. M 22, Ψ 44, 454, ε 334. He accords with Aristotle in the conjectures of Ὅτι οὐ δύσεσσι in Homer. (Cf. schol. ε 334), and in many other respects.

Other Peripatetics who are known to have engaged in Homeric studies are Dikaiarchos, Aristoxenos, Demetrius, and Demetrius Phalereus.

Not only the Peripatetics but also the Stoics busied themselves with Homeric πρὸς Ὁμηρον. Zeno, the head of the School, is credited by Diog. (VII. 4) with a work entitled πρὸς τὰ Ὁμήρου. Kleanthes and other Stoics followed in his footsteps. Not only Homer but also other poets came in for a full share of attention.

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[1] Schrader, Prolegomena ff. 389 ff. [2] Schrader, Philol XLIV. ff. 209 ff.

Receiving an impetus from the labors of such
prominent heads of schools the solutions of
προβλήματα, treating chiefly of Homer and of
other poets continued in vogue for many centuries.
During the Alexandrian period such criticism
was at its height and formed a leading source of
entertainment at all gatherings of learned men, as
has been mentioned. It is not necessary to my purpose to
extend this sketch of the history of the Homeric problems
further, for a full account of which I refer to Nitzsch,
Geschichte der Klassischen Philologie, I. p. 201 sq. Ilgen, opp. min. p. 109
sq. 1809.

Joan. A Cleves, de Polymathia Tractatio: Integri
operis de studiis veterum ΑΠΟΔΗΜΑΤΙΩΝ. Lipsiae, 1665. cap. X. 1799

S. [illegible], the Editor of Homeric Zetemata

Ἀπορήματα, treating of various themes and of varied nature, are to be found, in addition to Aristotle, in Plutarch (Συμποσιακὰ Προβλήματα), in Athenaeus, in Gellius, Strabo and other writers, and in the scholia to various authors, such as Homer, Pindar, Euripides and Aristophanes.

The subject of this study virtually limits the Ἀπορήματα to be considered to those occurring in the Homeric Scholia. For these we are indebted to the labors of one man, Porphyry, to whom is attributed by Schrader and other scholars the body of commentary from which the Ἀπορήματα present in the scholia were derived.

Porphyry (AD 233 - 304), distinguished as a Grammarian as well as a Neo-Platonist and enemy of Christianity, gathered together a large body of Homeric Ἀπορήματα from many sources at his disposal bearing on Homer, and edited them, after subjecting them to his own critical judgment.

Prolog. p. 345

a) Sketch of his Life

The life of Porphyry[1] divides itself naturally into two
periods, the first of which was spent in grammatical
and rhetorical studies, the last in philosophical inquiries.
The first period was spent at Athens as a pupil of the
rhetorician Longinus. Under this excellent instruction
he gained an extensive acquaintance with antiquity
and a wide knowledge of grammatical and rhetorical
methods of criticism. He was also granted a share
in the Homeric studies of his teacher, which were often
in the form of προβλήματα, and consisted chiefly
in aesthetical criticism and the study of minute points.
It is very likely that at this period he became familiar
with the rhetorical & critical works of Aristotle,
which are quoted so frequently by him. The Ζητήματα
τῆς Ὁμηρικῆς,[2] from which the Ζητήματα in the scholia are
are drawn

[1] Wellmberg, De Porphyrii Studiis Philologis, Berol. 1854.

[2] Schrader, Proleg. p. 349 sq.

H. L.

supposed to have been written during the time Porphyry was a pupil of Longinus, this is before the thirtieth year of his age when he went to Rome to attach himself to Plotinus. The rest of his life was devoted chiefly to the study of Neoplatonism, and the Homeric treatises credited to him in this period are of an allegorical nature. All that remains of this Homeric labors are fragments of his Ζητήματα Ὁμηρικά, preserved in the Vaticanus Ms. 305 containing Πορφυρίου φιλοσόφου Ὁμηρικῶν ζητημάτων βιβλίαι α' and in the Homeric Scholia Ven. B, and an allegorizing commentary on the cave of the nymphs in Od. N inscr: Περὶ τοῦ ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ τῶν Νυμφῶν Ἄντρου.

The fragments of the Ζητήματα Ὁμηρικά received favorable attention for the first time at the hands of Valckenaer (Op. II. p. 1339), who held that the Porphyrian ζητήματα, the work on the Cave of the Nymphs & other fragments, were derived from a continuous commentary to Homer. The position was successfully attacked by Wilderslever (The Porphyrian

b) Nature and Composition :

The nature, occasion and object of Porphyry's Ὁμηρικὰ ζητήματα are best told in his own words, found in the preface of the Iliad Vat., addressed to his friend Anatolius : Πολλάκις μὲν ἐν ταῖς πρὸς Ἀνατόλιον

Studiis Homericis, Göttingae 1883), who showed that the ζητήματα in question were from a collection of Homeric ζητήματα, having a definite method and forme, and who established the genuineness of the preface to the Iliad Vat., dedicated to Anatolius. Not to mention literature unnecessary to my purpose, Hermann Schrader, following in the path opened by Wachsmuth devoted many years to the restoration of the Homeric studies of Porphyry which resulted in the edition in 1880 at Leipzig of Porphyrii Quaestionum Homericarum ad Iliadem Pertinentium Reliquiae. Taking the Quaestiones Vaticanae as a basis, and holding that the one source for the Homeric

συναγωγὰς Ὁμηρικῶν ζητημάτων μονοβίβλου, Ἀνωνύμου,
κάμοὶ δοκοῦσιν παρωιδίαι, ὡς κἀγὼ μὲν ἔωθεν τὰ πολλὰ
Ὅμηρος ἐξηγοῦμαι, ἡμεῖς δὲ τὰ τῆς ποιήσεως κατηχήσεως
περιοσοῦμεν πάλιν ἐντεῦθεν ἡδυόσμου ἢ τοσοῦτον ἀπέχει,
ἡδύσματος ἀναγράφει με τὰ λεχθέντα μηδὲ διαπεσόντα ἔξωθεν
ὑπὸ τῆς λήθης ἐφεστιοῦσθαι. μὴ ὢν δὲ αὐτὸς τις πρὸς τὰς
αὐτῆς δεήσεις ἀναπείθουσι δὲ καὶ τοῦ Ἕλληνος Ὑπέρων
ἔρασταί, παρόντος τά τε ἐγκώμια ποιεῖ ἀναγιγνώσκει τά τε

Ζητήματα found in the scholia on the Ζητήματα
Ὁμηρικά of Porphyry, he traced the fragments of
the remaining books in the scholia to Homer and
edited such as gave evidence of being the work of
Porphyry. Pursuing a similar plan in a study
of the scholia to the Odyssey, Schrader edited in
1890, Porphyrii Quaestionum Homericarum ad
Odysseam Pertinentium Reliquiae. Here the [illegible]
in the succeeding pages to the Homeric scholia are also usually found in the works of Porphyry and I cannot
give something not [illegible]

πάλιν ἐκκινοῦντα προσθῶμεν, τὰς μὲν πλείους τῶν Θεμιστοκλείων προσημειώσεις ἐκ τοῦ περὶ ποιήσεως τοῦ πρώτου, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ οὐδὲν προσήκουσαν εἶναι τῆς κλίσεως ἡγοῦνται, ἐν οἷς ἡγοῦνται μὲν πολλὰ εἶναι καὶ τῆς ἱστορίας.

A casual reading of what remains to us of Porphyry's work shows that the Homeric ζητήματα which had been considered by him, were drawn from all collections of ζητήματα to which he had access. Schrader traces as far as possible the sources from which he drew. He recognizes chiefly three great sources: 1st A collection of the disputations of Alexandrian scholars, referred to in schol. I. 652, ἐν τῷ πανσιλήνῳ τῷ κατὰ Ἀλεξάνδρειαν νόμος ἦν προβάλλεσθαι ζητήματα καὶ τὰς μεταξὺ λύσεις ἐκφέρεσθαι κ.τ.λ. 2nd the work of some member of the Stoic sect, who compared a corpus of the ζητήματα of Zenodotus and other Stoics. 3rd A corpus Peripateticorum

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Prolegomena ad III. 23 Prolegomena ad II. 1-15 ad

consistency of solutions from the Διηγηταὶ ζητήσεων
of Aristotle and those of whom have been
mentioned as authors of ζητήματα. He believes
that this Corpus is referred to in Schol. K 252,
ἡ συναγωγὴ τῶν ζητουμένων γέγονε μὲν ὑπὸ καὶ παρ'
ἄλλοις· ἡμεῖς δὲ τὰ προβλήματα λαμβάνοντες παρὰ τῶν
ἐξηγητικῶν τὰς λύσεις ἐπιφέρομεν ἐξ ἑκάστου διαλύσεις
τοῖς προβλήμασι κ.τ.λ. The basis of Schrader's
argument is a comparison of the Aristotelian
ζητήματα in the Homeric scholia and Poetics
XXV, which contains many Homeric illustrations.
He finds a striking agreement, both in that the
doubts and vituperations of objectors are met, and
in the forms and method of solution. From
this agreement he infers that solutions in the schol-
ia containing the name of Aristotle, solutions briefly
treated in the Poetics and expounded at more length
in the scholia, in which the name of Aristotle is
not mentioned, and inquiries of the scholia according

with those in the Porticus although the solutions indicated are not met with there, — must all be derived from the same source. This source, says Schrader, is the Quaestiones of Porphyry, and proves his point mainly on the ground that the majority of the Aristotelean solutions bear the name of Porphyry prefixed. He thinks that the lectures of Aristotle on questions pertaining to Homeric criticism were taken down by his students and that these lecture notes were afterwards supplemented with their own observations. The argument for this is that many Quaestiones, containing ideas of Aristotle receive additions from some one of his followers (e.g. schol. B 649, B 326, X 165, passim al.). Then finally the Quaestiones of Aristotle, with the more general Peripatetics. Heraclides, Megarides, Telephus, Crates, and others, furnish therefore us a sense of the Homeric

Epilegomena p. 178.

disputations held in the Lyceum, were gathered together and embraced in a Corpus which may appropriately be called Corpus Peripatheticum.

This theory of Schrader well accords with the testimony of Diog. La. and others that Aristotle, Hermodorus, Megasthenes and other Peripatetics were the authors of Homeric Synopses, and with the internal evidence of the Iliad, as will be seen later

c. Nature of his Criticism.[1]

To understand the Porphyrian ζητήματα collected from many
sources of various [illegible] it is necessary to know something
of the nature of the criticism which Porphyry applied
to Homer. His work may be called a critical
revision of the ζητήματα existing before
his time, with many additions from his own pen.
How he handled them may be inferred from schol. K
112 [illegible] where he is replying to the charge
[illegible]. Taking into consideration the προβλήματα,
he would criticise the λύσεις, which had been given to
them; and some of these he sanctioned (καὶ τινας μὲν
τούτων ἐγκρίνομεν) as in schol. Γ 276, some he rejected

[1] ἡμεῖς δὲ τὰ προβλήματα λαμβάνοντες παρὰ τῶν ἐξηγητικῶν τὰς λύσεις
ἐπικρίνομεν ὡς ἕκαστον ὑπέτεξεν τοῖς προβλήμασι, καί τινας μὲν τού-
τῶν ἐγκρίνομεν, τινὰς δὲ παραιτούμεθα, τὰς δ' αὐτὰς ἐξαρτίσομεν, τὰς δὲ
παραμπὰς διορθοῦντες καὶ ἐξηρτύσαμεν, ὅπερ τοῖς ἐν παραλείποις ἔστιν ἰδεῖν.

[1] Wolfenbüttel p. 52 25

(τινὰς δὲ παρεμπίπτειν) ως τοῦ τ, ὅταν ὦσιν ἐπὶ φωνηέντων
ἀπολειπόντων (ὡς δ' αὐτὸς ἐξ ἀριστάρχου φησὶ τὸ Ψ 234, καὶ
καὶ ὅταν τὸ πλησίον τὸ καὶ καὶ ἐπὶ ἑνὸς τοῦ
(ὡς ἐν τῷ παρόντι λεγόμενα ἀπὸ τῆς γραφῆς) καὶ τὸ Κ 1.

The leading principle in Aristarchus' Reading of Homer
παρεῖναι τε αὐτὸν ἐξηγούμενον ἀεὶ γραπτὸν, καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον
συνήθειαν of Aristarchus, that Homer should interpret
Homer. To illustrate this Wellmann has made a collection
Ἀριστάρχου κανὼν τῶν Ῥητόρων καλουμένων Τοῦ
Schol. Z 201: Ἀξιῶν δὲ ἐμὲ Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου συμφράζειν αὐτὸν ἐξη-
γούμενον ἑαυτὸν ὑποδείκνυον, ποτὲ μὲν παρεκτικώτερον, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐν
ἄλλῳ. ... τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα παρεκτικώτερον ἐφάνη τῆς ἐξηγήσεως δεόμενα
τηρηθέντα καὶ τὰ ἐν διαφόροις ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς διανοίας παραλαμβανόμενα
ὑπὸ ἐξ ἡγεμόνων τῶν ἐναργεστάτων.

Schol. Μ 132: καὶ μὲν αὐτὸς ἐξ τρόπος ἑρμηνείας, ἐκ τῶν ὁμογενῶν
ἀρξάμενον ἀνὰ δρομικὸν ἐξ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ πλέον συνάψαι τοῦτο τοῖς ἑπο-
μένοις. καὶ ἔστι συνήθης ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἑρμηνείας τῷ ποιητῇ.

Schol. Vat. 55 to Ω 22: παρατηρητέον δὲ τὰ ἐκ πλήρους παρ' αὐτῷ λεγόμε-
να καὶ τὰ ἐλλιπῶς

Cf. with these passages the following cited by Lehrs [illegible] p. 10, in which the author refers to the rules of interpretation mentioned in the preface: 1. Σχ. Vat. Σ'. Schol. Pot. Il. I. p. 128. σκόψας τὴν τοῦ ποιητοῦ ἐντεῦθεν χρῆσιν. 2. Θ'. Por. Il. p. 294. (Schol. N 340): Ἡδέως δ' ἂν παραγράψαιμι τὴν τοῦ ποιητοῦ ἐν ταῖς λειτουργίαις ἐχούσαν καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμολογίαν. 3. κα'. Por. Il. p. 291, already quoted as Schol. Z 201. 4. λβ'. Por. Il. p. 336. schol. Il. Σ 309. Σῖον σημειοῦσθαι ὅτι ποικίλλων αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως ἑρμηνεύει διὰ δύναμιν.

Wellenberg divides Porphyry's Homeric studies into the critical and grammatical, & the former of which [illegible] the accurate study of Homeric diction. In this, as the passages quoted show, he not only studied the contexts of verses called in question, but also collected separate passages in which certain expressions were used, compared them with each other. This led to his grammatical studies, as the varied usages of similar terms led him to inquire into the original significations of separate words, which studies are collected among the fragments under the titles περὶ λέξεως and περὶ ὁμωνύμων.

The leading lines of Porphyrian criticism are seen to be in a general way with the teachings of Aristotle as laid down in chapter XXV of the Poetics, and the rest of this dissertation will show more minute resemblances. This leads to the inquiry as to the relation existing between Porphyry and Aristotle.

That Porphyry was an expert critic and learned commentator of the [illegible]

A proof of this is his Εἰσαγωγὴ περὶ τῶν πέντε φωνῶν, an introduction to the Categories (a proof of which [illegible] Organon, and two book works whose titles are preserved to us: Ἐξήγησις τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἐν βιβλίοις πρὸς Δεξιππον and Περὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὸν εἶναι τὴν Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους αἵρεσιν, βιβλία ζ'. The strongest external evidence of Aristotelian influence on Porphyry are the words of Porphyry in Plato's Tim. p. 18 C (quoted by Wallenburg) which affirm

Porphyry "Περιπατητικὴν ἀποδέδωκε τὴν φιλοσοφίαν αὐτοῦ τὴν Πλατωνικὴν ὑπογράφας."

Form and Methods of Solution of the Ζητήματα.

The ζητήματα, occurring in the Homeric scholia, exhibit certain well defined forms of expression and methods of explanation. The treatment of objections in the form of ποσ ζητήματα, at the earliest period governed by no fixed rules, has been one with fixed forms have been adopted both for the statement of the objection and the expression of the explanation. Thus the ἐνστατικός in propounding the objection usually begins with the formula, διὰ τί, πῶς or ζητεῖται οὖν. The explanation is introduced by ἐπιλύεται οὖν λύσις or some similar form. Sometimes ἀπορία is put before the problem [illegible] before the explanation, as in the scholia A 117, 118 [illegible].

General principles or methods of explanation have become crystallized so as to be expressed in certain formulae. These are ἐκ τοῦ τῆς λέξεως, 'from the language', ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου, 'from the person', ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ, 'from the [illegible] χρόνου, 'from the time', ἐκ τοῦ τόπου, by the place &c.

The points of attack for objections are usually

[illegible] the impossible (ἀδύνατα), improbable (ἄλογα), [illegible] (βλαπτικά), contradictory (ὑπεναντία), and contrary to the rules of poetry (παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην).[2]

The foregoing [illegible] formulated in the text of Aristotle's περὶ ποιητικῆς p. 1461 [illegible] ζήτημα.[3]

ζήτημα· ὅπερ ἐστὶ καθολικῶν ὄντων καὶ διαιρεῖται εἰς ἀπόρημα καὶ κατηγόρημα· ζητεῖ μέ τις ἢ ἀπορῶν ἢ κατηγορῶν. Κατεμίνοντα δὲ καὶ ἀμφότερα ἢ περὶ λέξιν ἢ περὶ πρᾶγμα. Καὶ εἰ ἐν πράγματι τὸ κατηγόρημά ἐστι, καθολικῶν καὶ ταῦτό ἐστι, καὶ διαιρεῖται εἴς τε τὸ ἐνεκτίον καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον καὶ τὸ ἀνιστόργητον καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἀσύμφορον καὶ ἀπρεπές. Ἔν ἕκαστον λύεται τρόπους πέντε. Ἢ μὲ διὰ λέξεως λύσις τις ἢ ὀνόματι ἢ προσώπῳ ἢ χρόνῳ ἢ ἄλλῳ

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[1] On the derivation of many of these terms from the rhetorical and sophistical art, see Lehrs, Aristarch. p. 203 note.

[2] On the significance of these [illegible] see Vahlen, Aristotelische Forschungen I. p. 135 sq.

[3] Quoted by Lehrs.

Τὰ 'Ενάντια', Contradictions as a Feature of the Universe.

We have seen that one of the points of view from which objections were stated by Aristotle, was ὡς ἐναντία. This idea has been badly [illegible] 'the inconsistency' as the impossible (ἀδύνατα) and the improbable (ἔξω λόγου) are likewise inconsistencies the first with the truth, the last with common belief.[1] In order to arrive at the Aristotelian idea therefore we must note his special usage of the term. This is to be found in the words – which have given textual critics so much trouble – τὰ δ' ἐναντία ὡς ῥηθήσεται (1461b15), or as Vahlen suggests, τὰ δ' ἐναντίως ῥηθήσεται i.e. the inconsistent as said in the words, in the representations made by means of language. Hence in this there is a contrast drawn to ἔξω λόγου and ἀδύνατα, which denote inconsist-

[1] J. Teichmüller, Aristotelische Forschungen I. p. 135 sq.
J. Vahlen, Beiträge zu Aristoteles Poetik, II. p. 35 sq.

enquire in the acts (cf. Post. xxvii. init.) and in the accusations, whereas in the τὰ δ' ὑπαρχόντα ὡς πράγματα regard must be paid to the ἀ αὐτὸς ... λέγει καὶ ὁ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται (Post. xxv. b. 15-16). How is the correct translation for τὰ δ' ὑπαρχόντα ὡς πράγματα, is 'the contradictory'?

According to Aristotle therefore contradictions of two kinds may occur, either the contradiction of the post to a statement he himself has made (πρὸς ἀ αὐτὸς λέγει), or the contradiction to what a man of sense tacitly infers (πρὸς .... ὁ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται). An example of the latter class is given by Aristotle as that τὸν ὑπάρχοντα τοῖς λοιδοροῦσι Πλειστοτίωνα (Σ 489, 1215) should be said of Amelas above of the stars (Post. 1164a 20-21).

Cf. init. Topica. ἡ μὲν πρόθεσις τῆς πραγματείας αὐτῇ τοιαύτη ἐστίν· ἐφ' ἧς συνεχόμενα συλλαμβάνομεν περὶ ποιᾶς καὶ προτάσεως προτείνωμεν ἐξ ἐνδόξων καὶ αὐτοὶ λόγον ὑπέχοντες περὶ ἑκάστου ἐροῦμεν ὑπαρχόντων.

In the oft mentioned chapter of the Poetics and the fragments of Aristotle's Προβλήματα Ὁμηρικά there are a number of examples of contradictions, which the philosopher endeavors to reconcile. These are sufficient to convince us that in the complete work contradictions were considered much more frequently, fully and systematically. We must too that his immediate followers engaged in this line of Homeric criticism, as is shown by the fact that many passages in the scholia, treating of contradictions, contain the names of Heraclides Megarenses and other Peripatetics. In addition, there are many Ζητήματα in the scholia, considering διαφωνίαι, in which no name is mentioned to indicate the source from which Porphyry derived them, it being probable that in many cases they are his own solutions. It is my purpose in this dissertation to make a study of the Ζητήματα in the Homeric scholia, which treat of [illegible]

to determine the principles which underlie the decisions in them, and to show that we have in this treatment of contradictions by the Eleonnoi and Xenoi, a well defined method of Homeric study, formulated by Aristotle.

Römer, from his study of the Προβλήματα Ομηρικά of Aristotle, has "die Ueberzeugung gewonnen, dass man Unrecht thut, wenn man sie nach dem heutigen Standpunkt der Forschung beurtheilt." So in the treatment of Homeric contradictions by the Eleonnoi and Xenoi there is such a contrast, both in purpose and method, to the modern treatment, referred to in the introduction, that it would be unwise to view it from a modern standpoint or attempt a comparison. Hence I shall follow out the lines observed by them in their criticisms.

Römer, p. [illegible]

Statement of the Contradiction

The technical side of the criticism of the Ἐναντιοῦσθαι and ἐναντία displays itself in the development of formulae for the expression of ἐναντία.

1. The passages in which the contradictory passages are quoted or the substance of them stated, in the formula, {πῶς / διὰ τί} εἰπὼν ..... νῦν φησι, or more fully πῶς ἐνταῦθα μὲν ... {λέγει / φησί} ... ὁ ποιητής ..... ἐν δὲ τῷ κ.τ.λ. (Schol. Z. 488).

E.g. Schol. B 2. Πῶς ἐν τῇ Α εἰπὼν τὸν Δία καθεύδειν νῦν φησι Δία δ' οὐκ ἔχε νήδυμος ὕπνος; (cf. Schol. A 104, E 348, K 144, Λ 111) et al.

2. The passages in question are quoted in sections and in some formulae to express that they are contradictory. The terms used to express contradiction are some form of μάχομαι or of ἐναντίον.

(1) The formulae with μάχομαι are in the main as follows:

a) {τὸ / τοῦτο} ..... μάχεται τῷ ..... e.g. Schol. E 576. τὸ "ἴλλε πυδαλίμοιο ἐλείην ἐκ πάλου Ἄρηϊ" μάχεται τῷ ἐν τῇ

πρὸς νηυσὶ μάχη ξὺν καὶ ὑπαὶ τῷ παιδὶ Πρωτεσίλεω. Cf. schol. Χ 111

b) ὡς μαχόμενα λέγοντες e.g. schol. T 244.

c) { τὸ / τοῦτο } ..... μάχεσθαι ... δοκεῖ τῷ - e.g. schol. B 814, μάχεσθαι δοκεῖ τὸ "αὐτὰρ Θρῃκας ἦγ' Ἀκάμας καὶ Πείρους ὄρως" καὶ "Ὑφιβάσης Ἀντιφορίδης γῦς τε μίγης τε, ὃς τράφη ἐν Θρῄκῃ" κ.τ.λ. Cf. schol. B 837, T 288 et al.

d). δοκεῖ μάχεσθαι ἑαυτῷ ὁ ποιητής ... e.g. Schol. H 8.

e). δοκεῖ μαχόμενον εἶναι τῷ ..... e.g. schol. Δ 216.

(2) Formulae with ἐναντίον and related forms:

a) { τὸ / τοῦτο } ..... ἐναντίον τῷ ..... e.g. schol. B 837, τὸ "αὐτὰρ Πυραίχμης ἄγε Παίονας ἀγκυλοτόξους" (ι 418) ἐναντίον τῷ τὸν Ποτφοναῖον αὐθις ὑποτίθεσθαι τῶν Παιόνων βασιλέα (Φ 21 154). Cf. schol. A 3, B 766 et al.

b). { τὸ / τοῦτο } ..... ἐναντίον ... { φαίνεται / δοκεῖ } ... τῷ ..... e.g. schol. A 3. τὸ "πολλὰς δ' ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς Ἄϊδι προΐαψεν" ἐναντίον φαίνεται τῷ "αὐτοὺς δ' αὐτοὺς φῆμι πυρὶ μενεαίνοντας ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν" (Φ 6. 458.) Cf schol. B 819. λ 234, et al.

c) ἐναντιοῦσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ..... Cf. schol. O 116.

d) ἐναντία ἐκείνῳ ὁ ποιητὴς λέγει - cf. schol. Z 265.

ἔχετον τῶν ποιὲ ἐναντία ἑκατῷ ὁ ποιητὴς λέγει "πρώτιστον μὲν ἀριστῆ

δὲ κεκμηῶτι μένος μέγα οὖκ ἀέξει" νῦν ἐνάγει "μή μ' ἀναρκούσης

μένος, ἐδκῆς τε λάβωμαι. cf. schol. A 52 et al.

e). τὸ ---- 'ἐναντιολογίαν δοκεῖ περιέχειν' cf. schol. Γ 65. 66.

cf. schol. B 649 and Ξ 240.

f) ἐναντίωμα --- φαίνεται. e.g. schol. cf. schol. Ψ 71.

(3). Note the use of διαφωνία and διαφωνῶν. Schol. Z 265; Z 418;

Ψ 358-95.

Explanation of the Contradiction

We have seen there are certain methods of solution which are for the most part applied by the dialectical for the removal of difficulties: ἐκ τῆς λέξεως, ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου, ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ, ἐκ τοῦ ἔθους. Naturally therefore the best way to treat their attempts at the reconciliation of contradictions is to consider their explanations under these heads. Sometimes several λύσεις are stated in the same ἐπαγγελία. Thus the contradiction between A 2 and Z 424 where Hektor is in one instance cupbearer of the gods but Hephaestus in the other, is explained as explained ὁμωνυμίᾳ καὶ λέξει, προσώπῳ, καιρῷ καὶ χρόνῳ, and Ethos Cf. Schol. E 749, Ψ 454, Ω 167 al. al. That Aristotle frequently thought out more than one solution is seen in Poet. XXV 1461a 31, where after giving an explanation κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως, he adds: εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ τοῦτο μὲ

κατὰ μεταφοράν. Hence frequently the same contradiction will be cited more than once as illustrating different principles of explanation.

1. Ἐκ τῆς λέξεως.

One of the considerations to which recourse must be had to meet objections, laid down by Aristotle in the chapter of the Poetics, analysed in [illegible], was the privileges granted to poetic language. Under this head, he says some objections may be answered by explanations drawn from the language: τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὁρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν (1461a 9-10). Accordingly he lays down, and gives illustrations of, a variety of

Poet. xxv. 1460b 11-13: τῶν δ' ἐξαρτιζόντων λέξιν ... ἡ καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ μεταφοράν, καὶ πολλὰ πάθη τῆς λέξεως ἔστι, διόμενον μὲν τοῦτο τοῖς ποιηταῖς. Cf. Soph. Elench. i.

λόγους, drawn from the language, which have already been formulated in the analysis.

Thus set forth and illustrated by Aristotle, the appeal to the language became the chief recourse for explanation sought by the λυτικοί, and was expressed by the formula ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἀπόδοσις. It was used for the explanations of objections drawn from almost every point of view, but naturally it would be especially applied for the removal of τὰ διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐν ἐρωτήσει.

a) Κατὰ μεταφοράν.

Metaphor, as found to play a prominent rôle in the explanation of Homeric contradictions by the Λυτικοί. The word μεταφορά was used by Aristotle in its most general sense, including every transfer of a word from its proper meaning. He recognized four varieties of metaphor: from genus to species (ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος), from species to genus (ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος), from species to species (ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ εἶδος), and metaphor by means of analogy (κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον). These forms are included in a general way in the figures adopted by later rhetoricians, in addition to metaphor, viz: synecdoche, metonymy, katachresis and metalepsis. Synecdoche corresponds

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Volkmann, Rhetorik p. 418 sq. Blass, Hermeneutik und Kritik p. 193

Poet. 1457b 7-10: μεταφορὰ δέ ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. Cf. Rh. b. 3. 1405a 5

roughly to the first two, while metonymy embraces many uses of the second; metaphor, of the third and katachresis, the fourth. Odysseus recognizes only the last of Aristotle's divisions as true metaphor.

In his first illustration of the removal of objections by means of metaphor the language of Aristotle is as follows: τὸ δὲ κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρησθαι, οἷον "ἕλλαι μὲν βοαί τε καὶ ἀκτῖνες ἔδυσαν πεπνύκασι". ἔπειτα δέ φησιν "ἢ τοῦ ὅτι ἐξ ἑνὸς τὸ τρωικὸν ἐθρέψαντο λεόντων συρίττων Ὀδυσεύς" τὸ γὰρ πάντες ἐστὶ <καὶ> πολλοὶ κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρησθαι, τὸ γὰρ πᾶν πολύ τι.

This passage has occasioned much difficulty to the critics, on which see Vahlen, Beiträge IV p. 265 sqq. Vahlen holds that Aristotle could only have meant K 1, when he quoted B 1. After noting views of minor importance he says there remain two possibilities worthy of consideration: either Aristotle wrote πάντες μὲν βοαί, and ἕλλαι entered from the Homeric text into the Aristotelian; or the solution τὸ γὰρ πάντες

ἐπὶ (τοὺς) πολλοὺς κ.τ.λ. refers not to the passages cited but to another citation which along with the solution of the first passage has been lost from the text. The last solution is the less probable because it remains unapparent to what words in the verses cited the solution obtained through metaphorical explanation can relate since it is difficult to see how this application can be made to Ἴλιος. Hence I allow myself to the view that the Homeric Ἴλιος has displaced words written by Aristotle. This view is confirmed by the schol. BA 194, where all likelihood this explanation of Aristotle is referred to: ὅσους μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων τῶν Ἀχαιῶν τινῶν ἔπη πέμπει ἐκβολῆς, ἅπαξ ὅπως μόνον τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ἐξαγορεύει καὶ τὸν Μενέλαον κ.τ.λ. That such careless inexactness of quotation is characteristic of the philosopher has been well shown by Römer!

Über Homercitate u. d. Homererklärung d. Aristoteles

We have therefore in this illustration an example of a διαφωνία in what the poet himself has said. The contradiction is that the poet, after saying that all the gods and men slept, should represent Agamemnon beholding the Trojan plain.

The λύσις of Aristotle for contradictions of the sort is that 'all' is said by metaphor for 'the many', 'the greater part': τὸ γὰρ πάντες ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλοὶ κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηται, τὸ γὰρ πᾶν πολύ τι. This is an illustration of metaphor, ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅλου ἐπὶ τὸ μέρος.

This metaphorical explanation that the poet says πάντες ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλοί, is made the basis of a number of λύσεις to contradictions, which bear evidence of their Aristotelian dependence. These, and others akin to them fall naturally under the Aristotelian division of metaphor.

Cf. Poet. 1457b 11 ff: ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου δὲ τὸ μὴ φαίνεσθαι "ἢ τὸ μὴ περὶ ὄντινος πρὸς ἔφραζεν" τὸ γὰρ μυρίοι πολὺ ἐστιν, ὡς νῦν ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλοὶ κεῖται.

(a) Ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ μέρος.

a) A 194 and A 424 : schol. H. III. p 40 : Thetis tells Achilles, in reply to his request to intercede for him with Zeus, that he had gone to Aithiopia the day before and all the immortals followed him (Οἱ γὰρ πάντες ἑπονται Α. 424). Yet the poet has just related how Athena had been sent from heaven to restrain the fury of Achilles (A 194).

The λόγος is : μήποτε δὲ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται ἐπὶ τοῦ πάντας τὸ πᾶν. 'For just as with reference to the Achaians after saying that all should perish he represents Agamemnon and Menelaos as aware (K 28), so he here says all the gods followed Zeus, when he means the most.'

This citation of the illustration used by Aristotle shows the dependence of the λόγος.

b) Ψ 374 and Γ 277. (Schol. Ad. II p 882 Rose, 142.) : This inquires why if Helios sees everything and hears everything (Γ 277), is he represented as needing a messenger to inform him about his oxen. Aristotle presents the

explanation, τὸ μὲν πόντος ὑγρὸν τὸ πλεῖστον.

γ) Ο 187 ~ Ο 193 : Schol. H. p. 5. Was objected that there is a contradiction between τριχθὰ δὲ πάντα δέδασται, ἕκαστος δ' ἔμμορε μοίρης and ξυνὴ πάντων καὶ νεφελὴ Ὄλυμπος in Poseidon's account of the division of territory between himself and Hades. One kind of this is, ἀντὶ τοῦ πλεῖστον· συνεχῶς μὲν τὸ πόντος ἀντὶ τοῦ πλεονάζοντος τίθησι, ὡς εἴ τις λέγοι· τὸ πλεῖστον ἐκεῖμαι πᾶσι γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ. τοῦτο μὲν ἔστι κοινόν.

δ) = 434 ~ Φ 196, Schol. V. p. 68. The river Xanthos is represented as the offsp. of Zeus (434) but yet Okeanos is said to be the source of all rivers and every sea (Φ 196). But τὸ πόντος δέκατον λέγει ἀντὶ τοῦ πλείστου.

ε) Β 614 ~ 1 174. Schol. H. p. 14 (Dindorf). Of Hiera Homer speaks of Crete as being 'ἑκατόπολις', but in the Odyssey (τ 174) he says of it ἐν δ' ἄνδρες πολλοὶ ἐπιμίξιοι καὶ ἐννήκοντα πόληες. Aristotle explains, μήποτε δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ

φορά ἐστι τὸ ἔναντίον, οἷς ἔστι τὸ ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ εἶναι (Phys.)
--- ἤτοι αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ πολλαχῶς λέγεται κτλ.
Cf. Porph. 145 76 11

2. Ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος.

The second illustration of Aristotle in the Poetics explained κατὰ μεταφοράν may be considered a contradiction πρὸς ὃ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐπορίσαμεν. This in regard to the line οἷον δ' Ἔμπουσός, ἐστι δ' οὐρῷ Ἀνακτὶ (Π. ι, 29, Od. ε. 275) said of the star Arcturus which Hipparchus had put along with other stars on the shield of Achilles. The objection made was evidently, why did the poet say this of Arcturus alone, which is contrary to what one would expect. Aristotle explains that οἷον is to be understood metaphorically of that which is best known, κατὰ μεταφοράν, τὸ γὰρ γνωριμώτατον μόνον. (1461a 21). Cf. Eth. Nicom. 7, 14. 1153b. 35 διὰ τὸ μόνος γνωρίμους ἵππους ταύτας μόνας ὁρᾶσθαι εἶναι.

This is an illustration of metaphor, ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος. The following examples of contradictions explained by this species of metaphor occur in the scholia:

a) E 741, v Δ 633. Schol. Hom. p. 267 (R. 148) Sh is inquired, why does the poet say at one time that the head of the Gorgon is in Hades (Δ 633), and at another that Athena has it in her shield. φησὶ δ' Ἀριστοτέλης, ὅτι μήποτε ἐν τῇ ἀσπίδι αὐτὴν εἶχε τὴν κεφαλὴν τῆς Γοργόνος, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὴν Ἔριν οὐδὲ τὴν κρύσταν ἐνῆν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ τῆς Γοργόνος γεγόμενον τοῖς ἐνορῶσι πάθος κατασκευαστικόν.

b) B 827 v Δ 105. Schol. H. ad loc. The language of the poet with respect to Pandarus in B 827, ἦ καὶ τόξα Ἀπόλλων αὐτὸς ἔδωκεν, is considered contradictory to Δ 105 sq., where it seems that Pandarus made his bows for himself. Explained from the language, τὸ "ᾧ καὶ τόξα Ἀπόλλων αὐτὸς ἔδωκεν" δύναται ὑπὸ τὴν τοιαύτην μεταφέρεσθαι. Cf. Schol. Δ 88, R. 146.

c) E 376 and N 658. Schol. H. ad loc. Pylaimenes, leader of the Paphlagonians, is represented as slain by the sons of Atreus (E 576) yet days later during the

battle of the ships he afterwards mournfully following the corpse of his son Harpalion on its way to sacred Ilium (N658). One method of reconciling the contradiction is by taking τὸν μὲν δὴ ὀρθῶς πατὴρ κτέ δάκρυα λείβων· μετανιστικῶς· ἐκ δάκρυα ἐξ τοῦ πατρὸς πυθμήν. La Roche (Hom. Text Kritik. p. 241) judges that the scholia to E576 were drawn from the προβλήματα of Aristotle.

Cf. schol. P125 IV. p. 147.

'Ἐ. Προαιρεῖ and Διαιρέσει'

One of the illustrations in H. Poetics of paralysing by means of accent, προαιρεῖ, Vahlen takes as an instance of a contradiction against the Aristotelian assumption of a main offence. It is with reference to the words of Zeus in the αὐτὸς ἄναξ which he sends to Agamemnon: κατὰ δὲ προαιρεῖ, ὥσπερ ὑπόκ. ἔλεγεν ὁ Ὀλύμπιος τὸ δίδωμι δὲ οὐ (114a1a 21-23). Light is thrown on these words by Schol. Venet. A. 166 b1 illustrating προαιρεῖ: καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὸς ὁ Ζεὺς εἶπεν "δίδωμι δέ οἱ κῦδος ἀρέσθαι," ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ ἐνετίθετο δεδόσθαι. These words, 'δίδωμι δέ οἱ κῦδος ἀρέσθαι', which Aristotle attributes to the dream of Agamemnon in B1 38, are found in H. Ω 2 77 in a connection to which he could not refer, and do not occur in the text of B1 38 (consequently by Wolf and Hermann and later editors) think that Aristotle must have read in B1 38, Πρὸς δ' ἐνύπνιον, δίδωμι δέ οἱ κῦδος ἀρέσθαι.

"Vahlen f. 417

The objection was evidently that a downright lie was placed in the mouth of Zeus, which is contradictory [illegible] inelegant. The difficulty is removed by changing the accent so as to make an infinitive instead of an imperative which removes the blame from the shoulders of Zeus and puts it on the dream. The manner in which Aristotle disposes of the explanations shows that he had made it his own.

The λύσις by means of an appeal to accent, προσῳδία and to division & punctuation, διαίρεσις, have a strong leaning towards textual criticism, and an appeal both as a means of solving difficulties. That Aristotle made critical comments and corrections in the text of Homer there is abundance of evidence (Schol. Β 212, Ε 334 α), and in this he was followed by the Peripatetics (M 2 31, Γ 62, Ψ 94, Ζ 106). Hence the reconciliation of contradictions by means of a change in textual reading, may be said to have an exponent in Aristotle.

La Roche: Hom. Textkritik im Alt. pp. 7 47.

ψ A 63 ν 1560 sqq. Schol. Vb III p 16 : It is inquired how this same dream is false and same true, as stated by Penelope in 1560 sq., that the portal dreams are of all three true, ἢ καὶ ὀνειροπόλον καὶ μὲν ἔπος ἔκ Διός ἐστιν (A 63), saying all are from Zeus. It is explained ἀπὸ τῆς συνεκδοχῆς· οὐ μὲν ὁ τε πάντως συνεκδέδωκεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τὶ πᾶσιον· ἔστι μὲν πλήρης· καὶ μέν τι ὄνειρος ἔκ Διός ἐστιν.

This explanation is strikingly like those of Aristotle, by a change of accent.

λ 235, 9. ν B 550. Schol. Vb. III p 492. Ἔνιπος βέλος, ὃς πολὺ κάλλιστος ποταμῶν ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἵησιν (λ 235, 9) is regarded as contradictory to Ἀξιός, ὃς κάλλιστον ὕδωρ ἐπικίδναται αἶαν (Φ 550). One explanation for this is a critical comment on the word αἶαν. Ἔνιπος δὲ καὶ τὸ αἶα μὴ τὴν γῆν δίχως, ἀλλ' ὄνομα κρήνης. φέρει δὲ τὸ ἔπος καὶ Ἐὔδοξος ἔστι παρ' ν. Ἀξιαὶ, ὃς κάλλιστον ὕδωρ ἐπικίδναται Λύκῳ. πολλῶν μὲν ποταμῶν ἐμβαλλόντων εἰς τὸν Ἀξιὸν δοκοῦσι, Λύκῳ τῇ κρήνῃ διαφέρειν ἐνίσχυσε ὕδωρ, ὅτι τὸ κάλλιστον κάλλιστον αὖκ ἐπὶ παρὰ ποταμίου ὕδατος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παρὰ κρηνίας φησίν.

Υ 257–272. Schol. Il. Mp 243. In the wall seems a contradiction about the piercing of Achilles shield by the spear of Aineas, which will be explained fully later on the [illegible] by saying that [illegible] contradictory to [illegible] (Υ 272) is to be understood not for διέπαρον but for διέθορον

ΧΧ αἱ δὲ ἰσαὶ αὐτόθεν ἀξιοῦσι μὴ ἔλασσον γράφειν, ἀλλὰ θλάσσον, ἔνιοθεν φάσκοντες ἀμάρτανται. τινὰ γράφει τὸ ε, τὴν λοιπὴν περιφέρειαν τοῦ θ περίττα.

'Αμφιβολία.'

The def^n of Aristotle illustrating ἀμφιβολία is a contradiction in the language of the text: τὸ δὲ ἀμφίβολον, "ταμφ. λέγω δὲ οἷον τὸ εἰρῆσθαι πλείω ἀμφίβολα ἢ ταὐτὰ ἢ ὅμοια τοῖς ὀνόμασιν" 166a 27 sq.

This application of ἀμφιβολία to the explanation of a difficulty in a particular passage, is to be understood thus: that when the Sophistes is founded on one possible conception of a passage, the other of the two possibilities contained in the ἀμφιβολία is made of weight for explanation. Thus ἀμφιβολία is such ambiguity as depends on the different senses of which two or more words are capable, independent of their punctuation. For the use of ἀμφιβολία in Dialectics cf. Soph. Elench. 166a 6 sq.

The passage quoted in the Parties is from Il. K 251 sq. αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν νὺξ ἔλθῃ, ἔρυβόν δ' ἐγώ γε

ἔστηκα δὲ δὴ προβέβηκα, παρώχωκεν δὲ πλείων νὺξ

ὧν δύο μοιράων, τρίτος ἡ δ' ὕπνου ἀνὰ δ. ἔσται

The solutions of this word by ἐξ ἡμισείας ὕπνου, which Alexandrian critics made short work of by the Aristarchi of κ 283, and which Aristotle without doubt considered fully in the Ἀπορήματα Ὁμηρικά, is presented in the scholia.

The difficulty is the contradiction in the words of the poet in saying that 'more than two parts of the night had passed by' and then adding 'still the third part remains'. The explanation of Aristotle given in the scholia may be summed up as follows: Homer did not say that more than two parts of the night had passed by, with which the statement that the third part yet remained would be contradictory, but the words are rather to be interpreted, that of the two portions of the night the greater part has passed by, and this indefinite time statement is made definite by the additional clause, τρίτον αὖτε μέρος ἀέξεται ὕπνος ἐδωδῆς. Hence 'πλέων' is 'ὑπερβολικῶς', permitting more than one conception of the disputed clause, and by choosing some one of these conceptions, the poet is seen to be speaking accurately.

γ. Καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως.

The language of Aristotle illustrating this method of solution has presented many numbers of difficulties to commentators: τὸ δὲ καὶ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως <ὅτι> τῶν κεφαλαίων οὐδὲν φασιν εἶναι ἔθος παλαιὸν "κυμινοῦ νεκρᾶ καὶ κασσιτέρου"; καὶ χαλκέως τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους, ἔθος εἶργεν ὁ Ξανθιππίδης Διὰ σιτοχορίαν, οὐ πολίτων οὖσαν: xxv. 1461 a 27-30.

Wachsmuth' attempts to interpret the words in this manner and renders as follows: "ab vinum non solum merum vinum appellatur sed etiam vinum aqua mixtum, sic κυμινοῦ νεκρᾶ καὶ κασσιτέρου non solum cera ex mero plumbo albo fabricata dicitur sed etiam cera ex qua plumbum album cum aliis metallis conjunctum est. Καὶ χαλκέως τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους ἔθος εἶργεν ὁ Ξανθιππίδης Διὰ σιτοχορίαν (cf. v. 1135), οὐ πολίτων οὖσαν: ab χαλκεὺς dicitur faber ferrarius (cf. 1371)

Wachsmuth. De Aristotelis [illegible]

sic ὄινοχοεύων γε νεκτὰρ infundit."

Ahlen[1] presents some convincing reasons against the interpolation of Wachsmuth and follows Hermann in transposing the ὅθεν πῶγων ὁ Ῥαν. clause to go to after χρύσεα δῶρα. He understands the first clause to mean, "alles was zu den Mischgetränken gehört nennt man (nach dem ὅθεν δέπας) Wein", which finds its application in the statement "hence (from grapes) Ganymede is said to pour wine (as) though the gods drink no wine, according to Homer."

The passage (ὅθεν) τῶν κεκραμένων οἴνων χρύσεα δῶρα, is inconsistent with schol. ε 93 which asserts that in Homer the gods drink pure nectar, not mixed with water, and this scholion is attributed to Aristotle. Wachsmuth's explanation was an attempt to reconcile this inconsistency but Ahlen more properly argues that such a view demands a consistency of opinion which

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[1] Hermeneumata ad XXV 20.7

Aristotle did not aim at the explanations made for different passages.

The application in the second example is somewhat obscure. When the connection is considered (H 259 ff.) the objection named seems to lie in this that Agamemnon's weapon caused the softer lin of the greaves to sound, and sprang away without breaking them. Accordingly Aristotle takes κατάγνυμι here not in its peculiar sense, but since κατάγνυμι is said also of iron-weapons, so would it be said correspondingly of the greaves, although they were made of some other metal or not of simple lin.

By κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως therefore we are to understand an explanation based upon the customary usage of language, as shown in the meaning of the word causing the difficulty. Hence difficulties which are removed by an appeal to the usual signification of a term, or by defining its usage may be classed under this head. Of contradictions explained in this way, the following are worthy of [illegible]

α) ε 43 and Ε 341. Schol. Ad. I p. 181 (K 181). A contradiction is found in Kalypso's mixing nectar for Hermes (ε 93) with the statement that the gods drink only pure nectar (I 341). Aristotle explains: τὸ κέρασον ... ἤγουν τὸ πῖσον ἄλλο ἄλλῳ ὑγρῷ δηλοῖ ἢ τὸ ἔγχεον· ἔμιγεν γὰρ δηλοῖ τὸ κεράσσας, νῦν δὲ τὸ "κέρασσα δὲ νέκταρ ἐρυθρόν" οὐ τὸ πῖσαι δηλοῖ, ἀλλὰ γλυκὺν ἔγχέαι.

β) ξ 303 ff. = K 132. Schol. Ad. I p. 181: He is inquired why Odysseus the first, when one ship alone was destroyed by Helios and eleven by the Laistrygones, speaks as if all his companions were destroyed by Helios (ξ 303 f.).
φησὶν οὖν ὅτι ἐνέπρησε ἅπαν μὲν πλοῖον οἱ ἐναντιούμενοι τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ, Ἡλίῳ δὲ οἱ συναδικοῦντες αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ νηΐ, κ.τ.λ.

γ) γ 454 = ν 63, 6. Schol. Ad. I p. 321: A contradiction is found the statement made of Arete ν Alkinoos, that they are ἐκ δὲ τοκήων τῶν αὐτῶν (γ 454) and that Nausithoos ... the father of Alkinoos, and Rexenor of Arete. The explanation is, τὸ ... τοκήων δηλοῖ καὶ τὸ προγόνων

Aj. 1264 ed S. Schol Ob 1 p. 328. The statement made of Revenue, ἔσοψον τέλος (γένει) is regarded as inconsistent by the following Critic, who says ἀπὸ διπόδων ἤρξε explained from the language, τὸ ἔσοψον οὐκ ἐκ διπόδων ἔσται ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἔχουσι κοῦφον, ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἔρχεσθαι πεζῶν.

Cf. also Schol. Ven. A. in Sch. Porph.

ἐν πολλαχῶς δὲ σημαίνει, or Ὁμωνυμία

After a number of illustrations of λόγοι derived ἐκ τῆς λέξεως Aristotle adds: διὰ δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἕκαστα ὑπάρχῃ ἢ ὑπολαμβάνηται ἢ λόγος σημαίνειν, ὁμοίως πολλαχῶς ἂν σημαίνει τοῦτο ἐν τῷ ὑργωνῷ, οἷον τὸ "τῷ βλέπειν χάλκεον ἔγχος", τὸ καὶ ἡ κυνὸς βῆναι πολλαχῶς ἐνδέχεται ὡδί, ἢ ὡς κύδιστ' ἐν τοῖς ἐποποιοῖς 1461 a 31 35. This is evidently a special λόγος according with those derived ἐκ τῆς λέξεως, added for the special treatment of passages containing ὀνόματα ἃ σημαίνει πλείω: 'if a word seems to express something contradictory it must be considered in how many senses it may be taken in the passage in question.'

Vahlen says of this: der 1461 a 30 noch folgende Text will offenbar, das πολλαχῶς ἐνδέχεται (πολλαχῶς ἂν σημαίνει) ist keine besondere Lösung aus der λύσις, da es ja auch bei der Anwendung specieller Formen der λύσις auf das πολλαχῶς ankommt." Consequently he does not include it among the twelve

[illegible]

solutions which he finds in the chapter the number stated by Aristotle are being present: Nicomachus occupies virtually the same position. Twining, on the other hand, omits of various possible solutions in the chapter suggested to which he thinks can be derived from the three fundamental considerations, and he classifies πολυχρησία ἐκ πολυχρησίας (πολυχρησία ἐκ πολυσημίας) as one of seven derived from the consideration of the Language.

I think Vahlen in his attempt at scientific accuracy of classification in a chapter so defective has been entirely unsuccessful, and probably, in removing nearer the truth in spite of the statement of Aristotle[3]: "The reader who regards this matter will perhaps be inclined to allow these few general remarks."

As there are a number of little importance being passed to be mine the twelve solutions referred by Aristotle I shall simply put my reasons for classifying more [illegible]

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[1] Rat. Nic. 1124 b 5: εἰ δὲ δόξειε λόγους τοὺς περὶ ἑκάστων ἐρεῖν καὶ μὴ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς πράγμασιν. [2] Poetics, Note 262. [3] Ibid.

λόγος suitable for the explanation of contradictions.
1. It is connected with other selections in the λέξις λελεγμένη and the same manner and followed by an illustration, ὅσοι λόγοι especially suitable for ἐπιτηρήσεις 1. 2. It has to do with the different senses of single words, which correspond to the Aristotelian usage of ἐπιτήρησις, explained and illustrated in Soph. Elench. II. 1 5, as a λόγος from the language, being one of the six recognized.

Εἰσὶ δὲ παρὰ μὲν τὴν ἐπιτήρησιν οἱ τοιοίδε τῶν λόγων, οἷον ὅτι κεκτῆσθαι οὐ ἐπιστήμαι· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιστημαίνεσθαι κεκτῆσθαι οὐ γραμματικοί, τὸ γὰρ κεκτῆσθαι ἐπίκτησιν, τὸ δὲ ξυνιέναι χρῆσιν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν ἐπιστήμην. ××××× Ἓν τὸν αὐτὸν καθῆσθαι καὶ ἑστάναι, καὶ κάμνειν καὶ ὑγιάνειν. Ὅσῳ μὲν ἐνίοτο ἕστηκεν καὶ ὅσῳ ὑγιάζετο, ὑγιάνει. ἐνίοτο δὲ καθήμενος καὶ ὑγιάζετο ὁ κάμνων. τὸ μὲν ἐν κάμνοντι ὀνομάσαι πολλῶν ἢ πλάσαι οὐκ ἔστι σημεῖον, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν ὅτι ὁ νῦν κάμνων ἢ καθήμενος, ὅτι ἐν ὀλίγῳ ἔσεσθαι πρότερον.

For the contradiction which Aristotle explains by an appeal to πεποιῆσθαι δὲ σημαίνει, cf. Schol. Vratisl. The question is concerning the piercing of Achilles shield by the lance of Hector.

ἀλλὰ δύω μὲν ἔαγεν ὑπὸ πτύχες, αἱ δ' ἔτι τρεῖς

πᾶσι διὰ χρυσοῖο πέλεν καὶ δι' ἀργύρεον τε,

τὰς δύο χαλκείας, δύο δ' ἔνδοθι κασσιτέροιο,

τὴν δὲ μίαν χρυσέην, τῇ ῥ' ἔσχεθε μείνεν ἔγχος.

It is considered contradictory to say that the lance was held in the golden layer (5 72) after it has been said that it had been driven through two layers. The difficulty, according to the schol., originates in the notion that the golden layer was the outmost one, and this is explained by showing that the golden layer was the middle of five layers of which the shield was made; then it is easily understood that the lance, after it had pierced through two layers, made a halt at the third, the golden one. Thus part of the difficulty is removed but not the whole of it. τῇ ῥ' ἔσχεθε may have the meaning "stuck" as was fastened in it.

Cf. Timmig und [illegible]

But this would have been contradictory to the statements that the gold stopped it, χρυσὸς γὰρ ἐφάνη (1245) and that the three other plates remained unpierced, (δύω πὶν ἔδυσε δὶς πάντως, εἰ δ' ἦν ἐν ἑνὶ χρυσῷ ξυνεχέσσι) This the spear could not be fastened in the golden plate without piercing it. Here Aristotle removes the difficulty by understanding ἔχεσε - ἐκωλύθη, or 'was hindered', 'was checked', which is one of the many senses in which the word can be taken.

There are a number of contradictions in the scholia reconciled by considering the different senses in which a word may be taken. None can be attributed positively to Aristotle or his immediate successors, yet they frequently give strong evidence of an Aristotelian influence; in addition to their similarity in method of explanation, eg. Cf. the language of the Porter in the schol Ξ 200, where a contradiction is charged against Homer for speaking of the earth as bounded (κ 87, Υ 58) & yet saying it has bounds: ἐπεὶ πῶς ὅρον ἡμᾶς ἔχειν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὠκεανοῦ περιεχόμενον ἔνεστι δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦτου λύσασθαι τὴν ἀπορίαν τὸν ποιητὴν κτλ.

a) Z 488 and κ 38. Schol. H. III p. 312. Some have inquired how it is that the poet after saying that μοῖρα cannot be overstepped, μοῖραν δ' οὔ τινά φημι πεφυγμένον ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν (Z 488), indicates that it can, ὡς καὶ τὸν λέγοντα ὅπῃ μόρον Ἀργείοισι βῆμεν ἄλοχον (κ 38). The contradiction is explained by showing by means of citations that the poet uses μοῖρα in three senses, ἡ εἱμαρμένη, ἡ μερὶς καὶ τὸ καθῆκον, 'the destined, the allotted, and the fitting'; in Z 488, μοῖρα is ἡ εἱμαρμένη., and in κ 38, ὅπῃ μόρον is to be understood as ὅπῃ τὸ καθῆκον.

A611 and B 2 Schol. III p. 85:

The well-known contradiction between A611 τοὺς — ἔνθα κεν ὀξὺς Ἀχιλλεὺς and B 2, Πρὶν δ' αὖτε ἔχε νόστιμος ἦμαρ, exists with the explanation that τὸ καθῆκον ἐνίοτε δηλοῖ τὴν ψιλὴν κατὰ κλῖσιν ἐπὶ τῆς ὠφελείας, ὅπερ καὶ τὸ κομψῶς κ.τ.λ.

c) E 576 and N 658. Schol. H. III p. 366 The incident of Pylaemenes previously mentioned has also an explanation based on the meaning of ἐλέγχειν' (E 576). 'τὸ ἔνθα Παλαιμήνης

ἐλέγχῳ" οὐ πάντως τοῦτ' ἔνεστιν, ἀλλὰ κινδυνεύει, ὡς ὅτε τοῦ "ξυνὸν ἔδαν· ὕπνῳ γὰρ ἐν ξυνῇσιν πᾶσι βάρος" (Il. 2.58). αὐτὸ γὰρ ἐμφαίνει τὸ ῥῆμα, οὐκ εἶναι λέγειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ οὐκ εὖ δὲ πάντας λέγειν.

d) 440 and 473. Schol. Od. 15.[illegible] he Odysseus account of leaving the Cyclopes he says that when he was so far away ὅσον τε φώνημα βοῆσαι (441) he shouted to the Cyclopes in derision, and when twice that distance had been traversed he shouted angrily to him again (441), and was answered by Polyphemus on the shore. This contradiction Porphyry explains by considering the meaning of the phrase, ὅσον τε φώνημα βοῆσαι; which he affirms "οὐ τὸ τῆς τοῦ βοῶντος φωνῆς συγγράφει — τὸ δὲ μέγεθος τῆς ἠχοῦς, ἣ γινομένη ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ βοῶντος ἐκφέρεται. If therefore, when at the first distance he shouted with sufficient strength of voice to be heard, it was possible by stretching his voice proportionately, at a double distance or at a distance any number of times as great

Ⓑ M 435 and Π 338. Schol. H. IV p. 134.

δ' πρῶτος ἐγράφετο πάσης Ἰλιάδος ... and back of H. xlv ... end of Sinope ... Porphyry explains ... ἐγράφετο ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐσχάτου τόπου τῆς Σινώπης πρώτης ἐπωνυμίας, speaking of the latter passage. Cf. Eust. M 435, p. 913, 8; ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ μὲν (Π) ὁ Πορφύριος τὸ ἐγράφετο ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐσχάτου τόπου, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ πρώτου.

Other contradictions explained in a similar manner as follows:

1. Ξ 200, εἶδε γὰρ ὀφρύσιν κυανοχρόας πέφνα μάχης, contrasted with contradictory to α 98, ἐπέφνον μάχῃ and Υ 88, μάχῃ ἐπέφνεν, by showing the various senses in which τὸ πέφνα is used.
2. Α 3, Μήνιν ... ἣ πολλὰς ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς Ἄϊδι προΐαψεν contrasted with contradictory to Ζ 458, μοῦνον δ' αὖ μιν φῶτα πεφυγμένον ἕμμεναι ἀνδρῶν, by defining the significance of μοῦνον.
3. Ξ 432, Ἕκτορα ... ἐν Ἰλίου τύκεσι ζωὸν ἑλόντες, Φ 196, Πριαμίδῃ τ' ἐν ἀδμῆτες πόληι, by showing the homonymity of πόλιος. Cf. Schol. H 327.

[1] Schol. H. IV p. 49. [2] Schol. H. III p. [illegible] [3] Schol. H. IV p. 65.

Ὁμωνυμία τῶν Κυρίων.

Along with πολυωνυμία ὀνόματος, should be classified the treatment of a number of contradictions in Homer which—so some scholars—are due to the names of Homeric characters. The incident of Pylaimenes already mentioned is an illustration; he, in E 576, is slain but yet in N 658 reappears, following the corpse of his son Harpalion on its way to sacred Ilium. The method of explanation for such difficulties was ὁμωνυμία, i.e. two different persons who have the same name are referred to.

a) Thus schol. III p. 261, IV p. 30, explain that in the case of Pylaimenes there is ὁμωνυμία, the Pylaimenes of E 576 being an Ἄρχων (Ἄρχὼν Παφλαγόνων, B 851), and the Pylaimenes of N 658, a βοηθός (Ἕνθα δὲ στρ[illegible] ἑπόμενος Πυλαιμένεϊ δαΐφρονι [illegible]).

b) Schedius, who is twice slain by Hector (O 515; P 306), is also a homonyme, the one (O 515) being a son of Perimedes (Σχεδίῳ υἱὸν Ἐϋ περιμήδεος ἀγλαὸν υἱόν), and the one (P 306), a son of Iphitos (Σχεδίου, ὃν ἄρ᾽ Ὀφέλτιος ἔτρεφε μήτηρ).

of Il. 2.546 and 13.518 Schol. H. on p. 51. The poet is accused of contradicting himself in calling Nestor the eldest of the Achaeans (Ἀχαιῶν), and yet representing Menesthius to be the elder, two generations (Il. 5.10). He is said to be the son of Areithous, named Korynetes (Κορυνήτης) of the town of the Arnaeans. Nestor gives an account (Il. 7.132 ff.). Killed by Lycurgus, he was deprived of his armor which Nestor had taken from Lycurgus in the old age gave the armor to his attendant Thrasymedes whom Nestor, when still young, slew. Hence Menesthius, son of Areithous Korynetes, must be older than Nestor.

This contradiction arose from misunderstanding 1. Father and son had the name Areithous, and when the poet says ὃν Κορυνήτης in H9, he does not refer to Menesthius but to Areithous his father, so that Korynetes was the grand-father of Menesthius. 2. Areithous the father of Menesthius was a Boeotian, the one slain by Lycurgus, an Arcadian

τὸ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως.

After the illustration of special λύσεις for objections in Prob. xxv. Aristotle adds a paragraph seemingly to give a comprehensive point of view for each class of difficulties considered. This begins ἔλεγχος δέ, and then follows special remarks for the consideration of τὸ ἐξ ὁμωνύμων, τὸ ἐν συνθέσει καὶ διαιρέσει (To this Jwanid adds the sections περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς, 168b 4-7) 168b 7-11. The special observation for the treatment of contradictions is as follows: τὸ δ' ἐπιτιθὲν ὡς ἔμφασιν αὐτῶν σκοπεῖν ὥσπερ οὖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔλεγχος τὸ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως ὥσπερ καὶ δοκοῦν ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ ἐξ ὧν προσήκεις συνεβήσετο.

Here the sifting procedure in the treatment of contradictions is compared with that applied to ἔλεγχοι in Dialectic. In this it must be established whether the ἔλεγχος is actually an ἔλεγχος, to inquire whether the συλλογισμὸς which the ἔλεγχος contains applies to the same object and in the same

Cf. Vahlen p. 95 sqq.

relation, and whether it is of the same kind and manner, and what there is for similar determinations, as is seen from Soph. Elench. 26. 181a 38: τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὰν ἀρχὰν γινομένοις καὶ ἔλεγχον ... ἐπισκοπεῖν τὸ συμβαῖνον πρὸς τὴν ἀντίφασιν ὅπως ἔστιν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ. cf. S. El. 167a 26 ff. 170a 7

Just as in sophistical refutations therefore, the considerations whether 'the same thing to whom etc.', 'in reference to the same thing' and 'in the same sense', are to be appealed to.

Teichmüller and Vahlen both connect the paragraph under consideration with the εἰ δὲ μόνος ἐκ τῆς λέξεως and the observation ποσαχῶς δ' ὁμώνυμα. Vahlen: 'ganz so für sich zu sagen, 'Kurz die verschiedenen Wege der Einzellösung mit mit Hülfe der sprachlichen Ausdrucke und dessen Erklärung lassen sich wohl unter den allgemeinen zusammenfassenden Gesichtspunkt unterbringen, der für die ὑπερκειτά an dieser Stelle bezeichnet wird.'

I consider this entirely too scientific a classification to suit the general trend of the chapter. In a certain sense it does include all the methods of solution under λύσις but it differs in a number of respects. They are not confined exclusively to the treatment of contradictions. They arrive at solutions by the study of special words in the passages in question, while the present point of view has regard to the connection of the passages, the circumstances which called them forth, etc. etc. In fact there is a more striking similarity between the passage we are considering, and the observation περὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, which Dahler recognizes as one of the twelve λύσεις, than that with the solutions under λύσις.

Hence it is wrong to regard the statements under consideration as merely a summary of what has been said. It adds a point of view, and furnishes a method of solution which exhibits itself in a number of explanations of contradictions in the scholia. viz: study the circumstances, the connection of the passages to see if the alleged contradiction is with merely imaginary.

a) Δ 2 and Ψ 234. Schol. H. III. f. 141. The first is accused of saying contradictory things at one time regarding sufferers of the gods in one passage (Ψ 234) and Hebe in another (Δ 2). One explanation is that Ganymede was caught up to heaven according to the passage, before and was not for the gods but for Zeus (διὸν καὶ ἀγχίμολον θεὰς δεῦ ἀέκοντας Ψ 234), while Hebe was sufferer for the gods.

b) B 548 and Φ 140 sqq. Schol. H. III. f. 154. Pyraichmes appears as leader of the Paionians in B 548, Πύραιχμος ἦρχε Παιόνων ἀγκεδόσσων, but in Φ 140 sq, τὼν αὖ ἐκ Παιονίης εὐρυρέος ἦρχε Πύραιχμος ἠδὲ Παίων ἦρχε δολιχεγχής, Asteropaios proclaims himself as leader. The explanation is that the race of the Paionians was divided, one portion of whom were designated as ἀγκεδόσσοι led by Pyraichmes, the other as δολιχεγχεῖς led by Asteropaios.

c) B 844 and Δ 221. Schol. H. III. f. 153. Similarly the Catalogue proclaims Akamas and Peiroos as leaders of the Thracians (B 844) but in Δ 221 the scholiast that Iphidamas was their [illegible]. But Akamas and Peiroos are not named as leading all the Thracians but ὅσσους Εὐρώπη τρέφεν ἠδὲ τέκεν (B 845)

hence Rhesus (K 434) and Iphidamas could be sons of those living outside the Hellespont.

d) 236 and 692 Schol. Od. II p. 487. In the Iliad (10.314) Helen is said to have twelve sons, but in Od. 15.58 the poet assumes as if there were only three. The context removes the seeming contradiction, showing that the three mentioned were his children by Helen: Τί οὖν ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐξ ἑτέρων ἔχειν παῖδοποιούς;

Other contradictions explained similarly are:

1. Γ 144 f, οὐ μὲν δὴ δύω γε τρόπιν νόος' considered contradictory to Γ 427 στρεπτὰ δέ τε καὶ θραῦ ξύλον, by calling attention to ἴκρια
2. Φ 388-90, Ζεὺς ἐβόλησεν ... ὅθ' ὅρκια θεοῖς ἔτεμε ξυνιόντας, as contradictory to E 891, ἀτὰρ μήν τοι ἔρις τε φίλη πολεμός τε μάχη τε, by calling attention to τέ

Cf. Schol. Φ 236 and

Schol. Od. T. f 237. Schol. Pl

Appendix.

The great importance of allegorical interpretation, as the chief resource of the early defenders of Homer against the philosophers, is well known. Along this line labored Theagenes of Rhegion (c. 525 B.C.), followed by Metrodorus of Lampsacus, Metrodorus Scepsius, and many others. Of the later philosophical sects, while the Epicureans rejected every semblance of allegory in their teachings, the Stoics claimed by allegorical interpretation that their opinions about divine affairs lay hid in the poems of Homer. Zeno, Kleanthes, Chrysippos, and others wrote largely along these lines; to them are to be credited almost exclusively the allegorical explanations found in the Homeric Scholia, the writings of Heraclides, Kornutus and Eustathius.

That Aristotle, like Plato, granted little play to the allegorical interpretation of Homeric myths seems to have its justification; yet there is one physical

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Wolf, Prolegomena p. 161-163.

explanations in the Homeric scholia, which, remind to Aristotle at first by Schrader[1], is now acknowledged to be genuine by Römer[2] and Schrader himself[3] is found in schol. A 127 g (R. 87), in explanation of the oxen of the sun: Ἀριστοτέλης γοῦν φησὶν· λέγει γὰρ τὰς τριακοσίας τοῦ χρόνου (ut annus) ἡμέρας πρὸς τὰς δώδεκα — — — — — ἀπὸ τοιαύτης ἀφορμῆς (127): Ἡ μυθικὴ φωνὴ τὰς κατὰ σελήνην ἡμέρας αὐτὰς λέγειν φησὶ τὰς βοῦς. τὸν γὰρ μυθικὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐπιπλεκόντως εἰς τὰς τριακοσίας μεταγαγεῖν περιττὰς εὑρήσεις. Cf. Eustath. p. 1717. Says Römer: "Mag der Dichter nun noch ein Bewusstsein von der ursprünglichen Bedeutung des Mythus gehabt haben oder nicht — das ist für die Sache gleichgiltig. Dem so überkommenen Sinne derselben hat allein und zuerst Aristoteles erkannt und wir sind durch nichts berechtigt, ihm diese Erklärung abzusprechen." There is slight evidence also that Aristotle allegorized the names of the gods (R. p. 623. 18), and Rose also quotes from Eustath. an allegorical explanation of Λ 62 (R. 187) attributed [illegible]

[1] Prolog. p. 423. [2] Die Homer. u. Hom. Frag. p. 20. [3] Epilog. p. 111.

The allegorical explanations of difficulties in the Homeric scholia are comparatively few. This is easily understood when we consider that Porphyry when he turned his attention to Homeric interpretation was a pupil of Longinus and therefore little inclined to find mystic meaning in the words of the poet. That in his later years, after coming under the influence of Plotinus, he turned his attention to allegorical interpretation is evident from his work, Περὶ τοῦ ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ τῶν νυμφῶν ἄντρου.

The allegorical explanations of contradictions are confined to one of any importance. This is in regard to the connubial relations of Hephaestos, that in the Odyssey (θ 266 sq.) he has Aphrodite for his wife, but in the Iliad Charis (Σ 382). The explanation given in the scholia is twofold, that it is necessary for Charis (Χάρις) to belong to Art, in order that it may be graceful and that he grants Charis (Χάριν) to Thetis on account of former favors done him by her (Schol. A Σ 382 [1041]).

Schmidt. Prolog. p. 349. p. 406 sq.

Furthermore, on account of marksmanship being graceful they associate with him both Charis and Aphrodite (W.p. 103)

That this bears the impress of the genius of Aristotle, who certainly believed in mythical forms when Homer uses them in his creations with the consciousness of a hidden meaning, is evident from Pol. II. 9. 1269b23 — ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ μυθολογήσας πρῶτος οὐκ ἀλόγως τιθέναι τὸν Ἄρη πρὸς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην (Oncken) (Cf. Metaphys. 1074a 38ff. περὶ ζώων κιν. 698b 36ff.).

2 Ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου.

As we have seen a second method of solution made use of by the Jewish was known as ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου. This signifies an explanation based on a study of the person speaking or acting. The poet of the Epos represents his characters speaking such words as are [illegible] to their age, their personal [illegible] the manner of life. Accordingly they often differ in their statements about the same thing, each one expressing sentiments of passion or [illegible] with his peculiar disposition. So too the poet may express our view in his own person (ἐκ τοῦ ἴδιου προσώπου) but yet be true to the right to put [illegible] into the mouth of his heroes. Hence [illegible] can be removed by a reference to the character, standing or motives of the persons concerned, it is said to be a λύσις ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου.

This method of explanation [illegible] from a variety of sources. Thus it is [illegible]

to explain what has been considered ἀμφιβολία (cf. Schol. A 42, Σ 344, 485 sq.), ἄδηλον (Schol. , M 25,), ἀδύνατον (Schol. B 63). But naturally its chief application is for the reconciliation of ἐναντία.

That its nature as thus defined was fully recognized is shown by the following passages: Οὐδὲν δὲ θαυμαστὸν εἰ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ ἐναντία λέγεται ὑπὸ διαφόρων φωνῶν, ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἔφη αὐτὸς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐξ ἰδίου προσώπου ταῦτα διὰ ἀκόλουθα εἶπε καὶ μὴ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις· ὅτε δὲ προσώπων πρυτάνεων, οὐκ αὐτοῦ εἰσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν λεγόντων νοοῦνται· ὅθεν καὶ ἐπιδέχεται πολλάκις διαφωνίαν (Schol. Bl. Z 265, III p. 300). Οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ἐν διαφόροις προσώποις ἐναντία ποιεῖσθαι (Schol. Ξ 414, IV p. 65). Εἰ μὲν οὖν ὁ ποιητὴς ταῦτα ἔφησεν αὐτός, παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ ἐναντία ἦν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος ἐστὶν ὁ λέγων, σκεπτέον τίνι ἑκάστους τοὺς ἀφορισμοὺς λέγομεν (Schol. Ω 411 II p. 436)· (cf. Schol. μ 3, 11.) Διαφωνεῖν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλήλα αὐδὰν ἐπικοὺς τὰ διάφορα πρόσωπα (Schol. Bl. Σ 495, III p. 313.) (cf. Schol. B 63

These passages present the ideas of the ancient on

the Limits of poetic contradictions. Such things as the poet has said in his own person must be unreasonable, but such statements can be have attributed to his character may disagree, in being the words of different persons. Hence, when two contradictory passages were brought up the method of the [illegible] Examiner is to show the poet had attributed the statements and in this way reconcile the difficulty.

Aristotle's Relation to Ἐκ τῶν προτάσεων.

There is no direct mention, as far as I can find, of a λύσις ἐκ τῶν προτάσεων in any of the works of Aristotle bearing on the solution of problems. But yet that he is the formulator and expounder of this method is evident from schol. B. 0449, (K 14), in the explanation of the contradiction concerning Ennius, where Aristotle is cited as follows: Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ τὴν ἔνστασιν ταύτην ἐκ τῆς πάντως τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντος ποιητοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀναιρεῖ· οὕτως γὰρ καὶ ὁ Ὅμηρος τὸ αὐτὸ πανταχοῦ λέγων ἄφρονα

This is the genus out of which ἐκ τοῦ πρόσω could easily develop [illegible] we may infer that it was a method for the reconciliation of contradictions promulgated in the [illegible]

In addition to this [illegible] containing explanations ἐκ τοῦ πρόσω bear evidence of Aristotelian influence: Thus for example, Schrader, following Urbs, assigns 44 265 (already quoted) to the Corpus Peripateticorum, which defines clearly the method also the scholia 106. is attributed by Schrader to the Peripatetics, one of the explanations in which is based ἐκ προσώπου [illegible] others an explanation ἐκ τοῦ πρόσω, is attributed to [illegible]

αὐ Ἕκτορ, αὐτὰρ Ἀχαιοί. Schol. Il. vi 300 · The first is a word of entreating (ἐπιτρεπτικὸν) on the part of the one saying (λέγοντος), ἐνδρὶ δὲ κεκμηῶτι μάχης ἄνου ἐΐσεε, but in the case of the other (ἐκείνου) [illegible] δ' ἐλαφρὸς ἐστὶ λέγων. The λύσις given is briefly as follows: ὅτι ἐνῆρά ἐστι πρόσωπον Ἑκάεργε· τὸ λέγε ὠφέλιμον ἔσται τοῦτο, ἔνερθε δὲ τὸ τοῦ Ἕκτορος τὸ ἀχθόμενον. Hecabe, ignorant of Hector's weariness is of the opinion that wine will be beneficial, but he corrects this, saying that wine will help him. Hecabe, not understanding, delights in wine for it is grateful and refreshing and gives him renewed strength. But Hector, young and vigorous, is greatly wearied, not only from the fight but also from his run to the city, and furthermore has tasted no food. Now wine on one who has been working moderately has a strengthening effect, but wearies one who has undergone some severe labor. Hence Hector used the most natural words under the circumstances; as also had Hecabe from her point of view.

b) Ω 527 and 534. Schol. H. M p. 490. It is inquired here in what sense the poet says in Ω 526, that exiles & men are from the gods, "Ἐκὰς γάρ τε θεοὶ τετιήκασιν ἠδὲ καὶ ἄνδρας, Ἥτε κε ναίωσι πόλιν κατὰ δῆμον ἐόντες" And in Ω 534 that Priam exiles upon themselves σόφρων ἀνοβδήσειν ἐπὶ μόρον ἠδὲ γοῶντι

The explanation proposed is that Achilles not knowing the law of Sacrifice that exiles men from the gods, but that on the Olympian Gods, who receive already the fate of suffering upon the earth.

c) Ψ 71 and 91 sq. Schol. H. N p. 508. In the vision of Achilles (Ψ 65 sq.) Patroclus wishes to be buried that he may pass the gates of Hades as quickly as possible; for the spirits do not suffer him to mingle with them, so that he is an exile around the abode of Hades (Ψ 72 sq.) on the other hand, Hermes leads the souls of the suitors straight to the abode of Hades where they mingle with the group of spirits around Agamemnon. A contradiction is seen in that the souls of the

dead in the one passage mingle with the spirits of the lower world, but in the other do not. Explained in two opposite ways the poet tells the story of the suitors and is therefore true, but the words of Odysseus were unjustly framed by Achilles.

d) Δ 4 and Ψ 244. Schol. A in p. 241. The contradiction mentioned in connection with Iliad 20 and 24, is also reconciled in opposite ways. The poet says that Hebe is cupbearer of the gods, but Aeneas, wishing to glorify his race, speaks the words concerning Ganymede.

e) Ξ 434 and Ω 194-6. Schol. IV p. 68. The contradiction, concerning the Xanthos, formerly mentioned (f) is reconciled also in two opposite ways; the poet says that Xanthos is the offspring of Zeus, Achilles, of Oceanos.

f) Z 458 and α 35. Schol. H. III. p. 312. The contradictions about the overstepping of fate (p. 78), is explained in opposite ways, that the words in neither case are the poets but are expressed by different persons. In one case Hector is speaking to Andromache, in the other Zeus is addressing the assembled

Other contradictions reconciled ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου τοῦ ποιητοῦ.

1. a) μ 141 οὐ γὰρ ἔτ' ἔμπης δύσεται φάος ἠελίοιο.
   b) λ 497 σείριος δ' ἐς μέσσον ἔβη κεφαλὴν δὲ κατ' ἄκρην.
   (a) the language of Nestor. (b) spoken by Phaiax.

2. a) δ 2359. Ἐνσπόρῳ ὅς ποδὶ κάλλιστος πεπαταῖ ἐπὶ μῆνα ἕκαστον.
   b. Φ 158. Ἄξιος, οὐ κάλλιστον ὕδωρ ἐπὶ μῆνα ἕκαστον.
   (a) is said by Πύλιος, because of her love for Εὐίππη

3. a) ι 411. νοῦσόν μοι πατρὸς ἔπορε Διὸς μεγάλου ἀλεύασθαι
   ἀλλὰ σύ μ' ὦχο πατρί, Ποσειδάωνι ἄνακτι.
   b) ι 275. αὐτὰρ ἐμὸν κέαρ ἐν στήθεσσι Διὸς ἀγλαὸς υἱὸς
   [illegible]
   (b) is the boast of Polyphemus, while (a) is said by the other Cyclopes.

'Schol. Od. I. f. 132.' Schol. Od. II f. 492.' Schol. Od. II f. 421.'

Ἐκ ταῦ καιροῦ.

Another favorite formula made use of in the blending of tenses is technically known as ἀπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ, or ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ, [illegible] the two combined and it, in order more fully to bring out its meaning, χρόνῳ as in one of the Lexx of the Ravenna contradictions which is stated as καιρῷ δὲ καὶ χρόνῳ (Schol. Δ 2).

Καιρός, [illegible] means literally proximus. The method of drawing a line as a tense in the eighth place [illegible] on it the tense of future and measure off [illegible] and remembrance, in relation to the one time element. To it also [illegible] the subtle element, [illegible] of the words as used, one to another, [illegible] with the underlying idea of 'time' and 'measure'.

From a study of the Lexx ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ in the Ravenna scholia, these ideas are seen to be fundamental in

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Schmidt, Synonymik d. Griech. Sprache, I [illegible]

ἐκ: explanation of difficulties. Thus we have often to
[illegible] the time when, as in Book 8, we [illegible]
the contradiction that Pyrrichus is [illegible] of the Paionians, while in 540 Asteropaios is their leader is
explained κατὰ καιρόν by the probability that the
[illegible] progressive [illegible] of the head of
some Paionians. Other λόγοι which the 'occasion'
or 'moment' notion in καιρός. For instance the ἐπιτιμία
found in A 15, that the priest of Apollo should curse his own
people and pray for the success of his enemies is reconciled
ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ· τὸν μὲν ἐν τοῖς πολεμίοις γενόμενον καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς
ἐναντίας στρατιᾶς εὐχόμενον ἀγαθὰ ἐξαιτεῖσθαι
τὸ σύμφορον αὐτῷ. So too the ἐπιτιμία that Phoinix should tell
the story of his intercourse with his father's concubine, is
solved ἀπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ· ὅτι τὰς παλλακίδας διαβάλλει πρὸς τὸν
Ἀχιλλέα ἕνεκα τῆς Βρισηίδος παλλακίσκου ζ 292 ff.

From the nature of the principle ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ,
[illegible] that it [illegible] to [illegible]
drawn from a variety of sources. Thus it is [illegible]

The explanation of [illegible] and [illegible] that [illegible] A21, A42, [illegible], I 455, N67 sq. and c 5*), Ἔλαφον (A420, I315; I370, K138, M35), Σκίλλαν (I378), Ἵππον (L381), Ἀνάψυχον (N67-9), and many cases of ὁμωνυμία which will be considered later.

Aristotle's Relation to ἐκ τοῦ κυροῦ.

The fundamental principle of this method of solution is stated in the Poet. xxv 1461a 4-8: περὶ δὲ τοῦ κυδίως ἢ μὴ κυδίως ἢ ἐργατικὸς εἶναι ἢ πάσχειν οὐ μόνον σκεπτέον εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πεπραγμένον ἢ εἰρημένον ἠθικόν τι ἢ πονηρίαν εἰ σπουδαῖον ἢ φαῦλον ἦθος ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸν πράττοντα ἢ λέγοντα πρὸς ὅν ἢ ὅτε ἢ ὅτῳ ἢ οὗ ἕνεκεν, οἷον εἰ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ, ἵνα γένηται, ἢ μείζονος κακοῦ, ἵνα ἀπογένηται.

This passage is directed chiefly to the consideration of such difficulties as are considered [illegible] but it is [illegible] to the [illegible] of objection [illegible].

Further evidence that Aristotle sanctioned this method is seen in the Aristotelian λύσις found in schol. Il. Γ 77 (Rose 144) to the contradiction [illegible].

messenger Lampetia is sent to inform Helios, who is said to see everything and hear everything (Γ 277), that the companions of Odysseus have slain his oxen (μ 374-9). Aristotle's explanations for this are as follows: ἤτοι ὅτι πάντα μὲν ὁρᾷ ἥλιος ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἅμα ..... ἢ ὅτι, φησίν, ἀρεσθέντων ἦν εἰπεῖν αὐτοῖς τόν τε Ἀρισταῖον ὁρκίσαντα καὶ [illegible] καὶ πάντ' ἐπακούειν· καὶ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα πρὸς τοὺς ἑταίρους λέγοντα· οὗ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰ ἐν ᾅδου ὁρᾷ. In the first of these explanations the 'time' is appealed to, in the second the occasion, the moment of the respective speeches is made serviceable. Other explanations of Aristotle, based upon a study of the [illegible], though [illegible] are found in schol. H 93 (R. 151) H 224 (R. 152) al.

The ἐννοιαστὶ explained ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ will be [illegible] under the two heads (1) time (2) occasion.

a) Λ 544 and Υ 237. Schol. III. p. 175. The contradictions concerning Helen, just mentioned are explained by Aristotle by an appeal to the time, receive a second explanation (ὡς νυκτὸς), that it is probable the men of Ithaka attacked Dolonen by night.

b) Ν 329. Schol. Vl. IV p. 246.) Par. H. p. 248. Ἔνθα δὲ Καύκωνας κτλ. now μὲν δὴ βουλόμενος is regarded as contradictory with the fact that the Kaukones are not mentioned in the Catalogue. Explained διὰ τοῦ ἀκμαῖοι they, not having come at the beginning of the war, are not catalogued with those on the field at the commencement.

c) Λ 2 and Ν 324. Schol. Il. IV. p. 241. The incident of Tantalus is also explained κατὰ δὲ τὰ χρόνα. It is possible that he, formerly regarded for this reason to Tros, hung a mortal, did not survive until the Trojan war.

d) Β 548 and Φ 140 sq. Schol. Il. III. p. 154. The contradictions in the leadership of the Phaeacians [illegible] mentioned as explained by an appeal to the time.

(Continued).

a) ζ 147 and Τ 497. Schol. Od. L. p 132. The contradictions between
αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν δὴ ἔπειτα θεὸς (ζ 147) and σφριτοὶ δέ τε καὶ θοαὶ
κοῦραι (Τ 497) is also reconciled ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ· τὸ μὲν πρόθυμον,
τὸ σφριτοὶ δέ τε καὶ θοαὶ κοῦραι, τῷ καιρῷ ἥρμοσεν,
b) κ 374 and Γ 272. Schol. H. m. p. 178. Aristotle's explanations of
the suitableness of the contradictory passages about the seer to the
[illegible] he [illegible] they were often [illegible] by [illegible] authors
c) ο 102 and θ 246. Schol. Od. Hp. 364. In θ 102 Alkinoös
tells Odysseus how men [illegible] and they will want [illegible] so
that the stranger Odysseus going home may tell his friends
"ὅσσον περιγνόντες ἄλλων ἠδὲ πυγμῇ τε καὶ ἅλμασιν
ἠδὲ πόδεσσιν. He [illegible] why he says πυγμῇ,
μὴ πυγμάχος ὑμῖν ἀνήρ ὀνήσῃ οὐδὲ πάλαισται (ν 246). The explan-
ation is that when they were [illegible] with Odys-
seus they thought they could prevail in all three games
but when Odysseus had [illegible] and the
and had boasted about the other games with the exception
of the foot-race, Alkinoös changes his tune and says

Ἐκ τοῦ ἔθους

One of the three objects of poetic imitation laid down by Aristotle was that which stood upon [illegible] (Poet. 1460b10). This is illustrated by the citation of κῦδος ἐφ' ἵππων ἠδὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ἅρμασι θέσθαι φωτῆρας, to which some objection had been found, most probably that the spears fastened in the ground could not readily be disengaged if an attack should suddenly be made upon the sleeping companions. The explanation of Aristotle is: ἔθους οὐ βέλτιον μέν, ἀλλ' οὕτως εἶχεν τοτε οὕτω γὰρ τότ' ἐνόμιζον, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν Ἰλλυριοί. Cf. schol. to this passage (R155): λύει δ' Ἀριστοτέλης λέγων τοιαῦτα ἐπὶ ποιεῖ Ὅμηρος οὐκ ἦν τότε, ἦν δὲ τοιαῦτα τὰ παλαιὰ σίδηρα καὶ νῦν [illegible] πολλὰ δὲ τῶν χρωμένων ὧν ἀφῄρηται

Hence we have evidence that the method of solution which affords a reason for the removal of objections by Aristotle for its formulator. This was afterwards technically stated as λύσις ἐκ τοῦ ἔθους in the scholia. Aristotelian terminology [illegible] contains explanations based upon

a consideration of οἷα ἦν τότε ἀνθρ. Thus in reply to the ἀπορία why the eighth council was held outside the wall, schol. K 105 (R. 152), Aristotle explains: "ἔπειτα ἐν ὀργῇ καὶ κατ' ὀργὴν [illegible] ἐκβάλλειν τὸν ἀδελφόν" as the objection in schol. Ψ 269, that the forfeit for the fourth contest was the greatest, two talents being of more value than a horse and a woman, Aristotle is cited as follows: λέγων ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ τάλαντον αὐτὸν ἴσον φησὶ τότε καὶ νῦν εἶναι κ.τ.λ. Cf. also schol. Λ 15 (R. 158)

Ἐκ τοῦ ἔθους is used for the explanations of difficulties [illegible] from various points of view, schol. [illegible], schol. Γ 379, E 7, K 11, K 447), ἀπορία (schol. Δ 291), ἀπορεῖν (schol. B 12) etc. The following contradictions are explained ἐκ τοῦ ἔθους.

a) B 827 and Π 105 schol. Ll. III. p. 153. The contradiction in statements about the bow of Pandarus is also reconciled ἔθει.. ὅτι εἰθίσμενα οὐκ ἐν ἔχει ὅπλον καὶ μάλιστα οἱ μηδέτινα τέχνην ἐσπουδακότες.

b) Δ 2 and Υ 234 schol. IV. p. 211. The oft-mentioned incident of Ganymede and Hebe also meets with an explanation

Ἴδας ... ὡς ποδάλοις κινουμένων τοῖν σαυχένοις χρῆσθαι ἵππῳ καὶ ὀχεῖσθαι, ὥστον αὐτὸ ἐν θεοῖς ζῆναι τοῦτο.

c) K. 103.4. Schol. Ge. II. p. 455. The statements that the Epeiochoroi were few in number is considered contradictory to the notion that they were [illegible] above of two feet. Explained ἐκ τοῦ ἔθους, ἐθίσασθαι μὲν τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ ἐς ἄλλο χρῆσθαι, πρός τε ἀλέην καὶ φῦσι καὶ κατασκευήν.

d) K 514 and K 494 Schol. Il. m p. 453. In commenting on the account of the slaughter of Rhesos and his companions, and afterwards of Hektor, it is objected that the poet, though he had told of fourteen being killed, of whom Hektor was the last, speaks of Hektor as the thirteenth, K 514, ὃν τρισκαιδέκατον κτάνον ἠδ' ὄλεσσε. The explanation is as follows: Ὅμηρος δὲ τοὺς Θρᾳκῶν ὧν στρατιωτῶν χωρίζει καὶ ἐξοχήν. ἔθνος οὖν καὶ ὧν ἄρχουσιν ὁ Ῥῆσος, ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ Διὸς οὖν Ἰριδὸς τε καὶ Ἕκτορα (N 15.2).

e) Cf. Maass, Schol. Il. VI. p. 214 to P 755.

Other Contradictions and Explanations.

The Syzygies treated in the preceding pages do not exhaust the list of passages in the Homerica & Scholia giving evidence of being the work of Eratosthenes and Aristarchus, in which contradictions are noted; and a number of the contradictions treated have other explanations in addition to those that have been mentioned. My reason for omitting them is apparent; there is in them no evidence of a systematic method of treatment, in accordance with the teachings of Aristotle & for they are usually fanciful or absurd, or merely show shots at explanations. I shall therefore merely give references to these passages in the Scholia, leaving each one to find other explanations of contradictions noted by him.

Schol. H. A3. v. III p. 2.

" "B 649. v. III. p. 144

" " Γ 65, 6. v. III p. 163.

" "E 741 v. III p. 761.

" "H 9 v. II p. 317.

" "Θ 555. v. II p. 173.

" "P 125 v. II. p. 147.

Schol. H. Φ 2. v. IV. p. 251.

" Od. λ 235, 9 v. II p. 492.

Schol. Il. A 520 . III. f. 218	Schol. Od. [illegible]
" " [illegible] 451 . IV. p. 186.	" " [illegible] 410.
" " Y 312, 4 IV f. 246.	" " A [illegible] II b. 106.
" " X 141 IV f. 290.	" " II 116 II f. 627.

Conclusion

Thus far I have taken care merely to present Aristotle's method of Homeric study as shown in the unique treatment of contradictions without any remark whatever on the nature or value of his work. Attracted by evidence of Aristotelian influence in the explanation of contradictions in the Homeric scholia, I made a study of them which convinced me that Aristotle developed a treatment of Homeric contradictions with well defined principles and methods of application. This I have endeavored to set forth. It is certainly profitable to note how extensively Aristotle dealt with a problem of so much interest to modern scholars.

How much value are we to attach to his labors in this line? This question is of moment as the explanations considered permit us to form a judgment as to Aristotle's understanding and grasp of the problems of the higher criticism [illegible]

Lehrs (p.30) estimate of Aristotle's Homeric labours was very low. ... of Homerum explicandum [illegible] parum doctum ... [illegible] ... [illegible] cum credere fabulas. And Köstlin (p.302) in his remarks on Aristotle's treatment of inconsistencies, criticises it as follows: "Wenn wir nun auch auf der einen Seite anerkennen müssen, dass hier ganz gute Ansätze zu streng philologischer Betrachtung genommen sind ... so muss man andererseits sich wieder darüber wundern, dass Aristoteles da nicht einmal auf die Idee gekommen ist, die zu dem richtigen Weg hätte führen können; denn wenn sich derselbe sogar einmal bis zur Höhe einer philologischen, wenn auch vielleicht Conjecturen aufschwingt, so sollte man doch auch hier erwarten, dass er auch auf diesem Gebiete einen rüstigen Schritt wage; aber nichts davon." Warum möchte ich in dieser Frage gegenüber Köstlin seiner Etymologien als die schwächste Leistung bezeichnen.

Rémi's views is necessarily narrowed as he has confined his attention to the four examples of contradiction preserved in the fragments of Aristotle's ἐπιχειρήματα. Quoted without making a study of the principles back of the refutations, as known in the Poetics, and using the light to be drawn from the scholia. Hence his criticism is based on too narrow grounds and is consequently is inconclusive. A brief consideration will lead I think to a juster estimate.

It is improper to judge Aristotle's work from the modern standpoint of inquiry, as his aims of work, and motives, were very different from those of a modern investigator. When he came to the defense of Homer against his detractors, κριτικοί and χωρίζοντες, as Homer puts it, was yet in their swaddling clothes. He had no theory of the composite nature of Homer to offend against. The situation was this, Homeric verses were brought to the test of Aristotle's Poetics and the fact proved that Homer by writing

Halliwell

principles of explanations. The polemic attitude of Aristotle and the nature of the questions he was trying to solve must always be borne in mind to understand his criticisms. And whatever be said of this, one thing can be claimed with positiveness that Aristotle's explanations of difficulties are as good, if they are not better than all similar attempts which are known to us from his predecessors or contemporaries. This is shown in a number of Aristotelian explanations — but the rest of these — cited [illegible] mentioned by Hitzig.

The number of contradictions objected to is an evidence of the acquaintance of the σπουδαιοί with Homer and of their zeal in attacking him. The nature of those cited is interesting as many true passages which are quoted in any way the least contradictions or which could called as questions as σπουδαία. Many of the only contradictory, as the passages concerning Ajax's

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[1] Cf. Hitzig, Die Hom. Schrift. d. Ar. p. 258 [2] Schr. Por. II. p. 165

and the nocturnal slumbers of Zeus; others are purely fanciful as those about the Gorgon's head and the swift failure-verse; while others are far fetched and abound in those concerning the formation of the words of the poet (Εὐριπίδης and Epicharmus in the Κόλαξ).

Leaving now the methods of exploration the λέξις is certainly a fitting consideration to which reasons should be laid for the removal of difficulties. Since by λέξις Aristotle understands the expression of the thought by means of words (ἐστὶν μὲν λόγων ἡ λέξις· λόγῳ δὲ ... λέξιν εἶναι τὴν διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἑρμηνείαν, Poet. VI. 1450 b 12 sq.) it is the most natural appeal in the case of ἀσυνηθῆ which originate in the language. The explanations treated under this head, whatever may be their ultimate value, are often very ingenious and multifarious and diverse. There is in them much that is fanciful and absurd but yet much that may be regarded as good. In another sense features of general value the explanation τῶν ἰδίων (καὶ κυρίων) makes under certain

is usually fitting in its application, especially in the case of hundred-eyed Argus: if anyone is offended to explain the all-seeing power of Helios as fanciful and was meant to be so. The concession it grants to poetic liberty makes it particularly valuable. ποικίλως δ' ἂν ἡμῖν ... of principles of grammatical interpretation employed by modern scholars. The importance of studying passages, regarded as contradictory, in their immediate surroundings, successfully applied by the dictum, the τὸ τὸ δὶς τὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ δὶς τὸ κ.τ.λ., has an advocate in Cauer, though he shows no dependence upon Aristotle.

The rest of the section is interesting in the main in proportion as what Aristotle and his followers regarded as contradictory to its application to the contradictory statements about wine, about Ganymede and Hebe, about the Xanthus &c. It is feasible, but Römer-Prinzing is right in showing its weakness in the passages about Crete. The same can be said of the contradictions about the ...

Bl. Mus. xxxv. 7 (1)

of evils to be measured etc. The view it presents of Homeric mimesis is worthy of note.

Ἐκ τοῦ κύκλῳ, in its essential elements, is a true principle of criticism. The application in the contradiction about Helen is extremely fanciful, as also in the endeavor to explain Ganymedes presence in heaven; but some might be found in the appeals to the 'occasion'.

The slight use of ἐκ τοῦ ἔθους shows nothing objectionable.

There is no doubt that Homer did not think of the [illegible] finesses, [illegible] and [illegible] discovers in his simplest verses, and in many passages the solicitudes of the commentator has led him far afield. Yet I think we must say Homer is wrong in asserting that Aristotle never got on the right track and made no strides forward. The underlying principles of his method give evidences of true critical judgment though it cannot be denied they were frequently carried to fanciful extremes. We should be thankful for the shedding of some light on many dark and disputed points, which even in our time [illegible]

thoroughly explained.

To sum up, Aristotle's recognition as means of explanation (a) of grammatical interpretation as shown in the appeals to διάλεκτος; (b) of studying every question on the basis of its particular surroundings; (c) and of historical interpretation as shown in the appeals to καιρός and ἔθος, — shows an insight into the correct explanation of contradictions, which deserves the more credit on account of the early period in which it was gained.

The shortcomings of the labors of the Analysts in the reconciliations of contradictions is apparent. The explanations to [illegible] passages are rarely adequate. There is no comparison of contradictions with contradictions, and the various methods are frequently applied in such a way as to demonstrate their absurdity. There is no reference to the grander points of poetic unity and harmony, no conception of the true nature of the epos, no appeal to the antique manner of thinking, no appreciation of the poets longing for the beautiful at the expense of the [illegible]

should be given to Aristotle and Longinus for the philological insight exhibited in their treatment of Homeric contradictions and for the few nuggets of gold which they have contributed to the criticism of Homer.

FINIS.

Biographical Sketch.

I was born at Wise Forest in the State of North Carolina June 2nd 1870. After spending a number of years in the graded schools of Lexington and Fredericksville Va I matriculated in the fall of 1884 at Richmond College Richmond Va. In June 1887 I was awarded the Junior Medal in French and a year later I received the degree of Master of Arts at the same institution. The session of 88-89 was spent in teaching in the City Schools of Asheville, N.C.

Since October 1889 I have been studying French, Spanish and Latin in the Johns Hopkins University under Professors Hildebrand, Bloomfield and Warren and Doctors Spieker, Smith, Williams and Jones. Each year I was appointed Fellow in French. At present I am closing this sketch to express my appreciation of the opportunities to all my teachers in Richmond and in Baltimore for the instruction and inspiration they have so freely given me.

A. Mitchell Carroll.